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I. Introduction
Robbie the Robot, R2-D2 and similar robot-heroes are some of
the most popular characters in many science fiction stories. These
. Staff Law Clerk, Seventh Circuit, U.S. Court of Appeals; J.D., University of
Pennsylvania 2003. For their helpful comments and encouragement, the author would like
to thank Gideon Parchimovsky and R. Polk Wagner.
characters are always close at hand loading their memory banks with
an enormous array of useful data about their owners, including their
tendencies, likes and dislikes. This personal information is collected
under the assumption that it will be used to better serve their
compatriots; but what would happen if those "memories" fell into the
wrong hands? All that stored information could be used for harmful
purposes. The question thus presents itself: do we really want to own
R2-D2?
Although modern machines do not yet have vibrant
personalities, they are storing a great deal of personal information.
The computer can attempt to use the stored data to ease the user's
burden while they surf the web. When a person decides to purchase a
book, for instance, a personal computer can communicate with a
website to prepare to purchase the book, have suggestions for other
products in which the user might be interested, and offer discounts for
those goods. The current day version of R2-D2 would not only offer
Luke Skywalker his lightsaber, but also suggest alternate brands and
maybe a discount on an accompanying blaster.
This sort of near telepathic technology was first being put to use
in the middle to late 1990s. 2 Online stores were beginning to
recognize and remember users from previous visits to their sites. The
stores could offer special bargains for their return customers and
simplify the purchasing procedure. Users could subscribe to online
newspapers and the sites could distinguish their subscribers and allow
them access to special content.
Marketers began to utilize this new technology to observe users'
behavior. The marketers could start to use the information about
people's online conduct to offer special deals on products in which a
user's online activity indicated they might be interested . For the first
time online, a bargain could be specifically tailored for a single user.
Essentially, the World Wide Web was beginning to customize its
presentation for each individual consumer. The Internet appeared as
1. For example, Amazon.com, an online bookstore, can currently give
recommendations about products in which a user may be interested based on prior
purchases, information volunteered by the user, and comparisons with other customers'
activity. Amazon.com can then recommend products to a customer as soon as that person
visits the site, without the user even having to identify themselves manually to the site.
2. John Schwartz, Giving Web a Memory Cost Its Users Privacy, N.Y. TIMES, Sept.
4, 2001 (explaining the invention of technology that allowed websites to recognize users on
subsequent visits).
3. Id. (discussing some of the benefits from online tracking technology).
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though it was on the verge of becoming a utopian market for
information.
The companies that were developing this near perfect cyber-
world overlooked several important issues, however. First, just like
the movie robots, in order for the web to tailor the information it
presented to a user it had to collect detailed data about that user -
and the more detailed the information the better. An online store
could not offer special discounts to specific customers if the site could
not distinguish its customers and where their interests may lay. A
tension arose, however, because many people felt as though their visit
to the web should be a private activity and should therefore be an
activity into which others should not intrude.4 Websites' desire to
collect information about their customers was conflicting with many
individuals' sense of personal space.
While the debate over privacy has been going on for over one
hundred years, there were a few key differences that made the online
problem unique. Primarily, the technology involved with the Internet
allowed online surveillance to occur essentially invisibly to the user. It
is virtually impossible for a user to keep track of all of the ways that
they can be monitored while surfing the web. Also, under the current
regulatory model (or absence thereof) for online information, there is
almost no way for a user to prevent the collection of their personal
information.
In the mid-1990s, the problem was compounded because the web
marketers were harvesting information en masse without attempting
to acquire the users' consent The technology that first allowed
websites to recognize users - the notorious cookie - was brought on
to the scene with little fanfare. It was simply introduced to make
online transactions more convenient by allowing websites to
remember a user on subsequent visits.6 As the web became more
4. See, e.g., FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, PRIVACY ONLINE: A REPORT TO
CONGRESS 1 (June 1998) [hereinafter 1998 FTC REPORT] ("While the online consumer
market is growing exponentially, there are also indications that consumers are wary of
participating in it because of concerns of how their personal information is used."),
available at http://www.ftc.gov/reports/privacy3/priv-23a.pdf; Elec. Info. Privacy Ctr.,
Surfer Beware: Personal Privacy and the Internet (June 1997) (stating that online privacy
was one of internet users' top concerns in 1997), available at
http://www.epic.org/reports/surfer-beware.html (last visited May 25, 2005).
5. See, e.g., Elec. Info. Privacy Ctr., Surfer Beware: Personal Privacy and the Internet
(June 1997) (few websites in 1997 had posted privacy policies), available at
http://www.epic.org/reports/surfer-beware.html (last visited May 25, 2005).
6. Schwartz, supra note 2 (describing that online tracking technology was originally
created to add convenience to online transactions).
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popular, web designers were increasingly using cookies to collect
more expansive information about an ever-growing online
population.' At the time, the data collectors did not pause to consider
the harm this practice occasioned on consumers. After all, the owners
of the websites felt as though they were just collecting information so
they could better serve the customers. Unfortunately, many users did
not share this same perspective.
As users were increasingly tracked online, they were beginning
to openly express concerns about the collection of their personal
information.8 Many legislators took their cue and started trying to
develop methods to protect personal information. At the same time,
the developers of online technology also sought to develop software
that could answer consumer calls for more protection online. Internet
and privacy scholars have also struggled to overcome the privacy
impasse. 9 Unfortunately, they have not yet been able to overcome the
difficulties that both government and industry have encountered.
Even the simple definition of what constitutes privacy has proven to
be elusive. Worse yet, assuming a definition could be agreed upon, a
clear method with which to place a value on privacy has yet to be
developed. The twin obstacles of defining and gauging privacy have
thwarted any serious efforts to respond to the consumer outcry. The
best possible solution is, therefore, to approach the matter from a
different perspective. Ironically, the same technology that makes the
online privacy problem distinct from the offline issues may also help
to solve the problem in a simpler manner than it could be approached
offline. Rather than trying to define the nebulous notion of Internet
privacy, a more goal-oriented approach may be an improved tactic. In
this article, I argue that the existing approach to the privacy
conundrum is misguided. Given the vague nature of privacy and the
fact that individuals place such wide-ranging values on their personal
7. Id.
8. Louis Harris & Assocs. & Dr. Alan F. Westin, Commerce, Communication, and
Privacy Online, A National Survey of Computer Users 20-21 ( 1997) ("Of those who use
the World Wide Web and have been asked by a site to provide information, the majority
have at some point declined to give that information. The majority of those who did not
provide the information say they would have provided it if they were aware of,
comfortable with, the information use policies of those sites or if they were more familiar
with those sites."), available at http://www.pandab.org/compsurv.html (last visited May 25,
2005); Business Week! Harris Poll: Online Insecurity, Bus. WEEK, Mar. 16, 1998 at 102
(finding that of those consumers who did not use the Internet as of February 1998, 61%
would be more likely to start using the Internet if the privacy of their personal information
and communications was protected), available at http://www.businessweek.com/
1998/11/b3569107.htm (last visited May 25, 2005).
9. See discussion infra Part C.
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information, all attempts at a one-size-fits-all answer have met with
the same fate. I propose that a superior approach for the online issues
is to use the strengths of both various technological and governmental
privacy models to develop a hybrid solution that allows individuals
and marketers to work together to determine their own value for
personal information.
An automated system could be designed using existing
technology that would allow users' browsers to silently negotiate with
websites behind the scenes as users surf the web. A user could
program their privacy preferences into their browser before they ever
log on to the Internet. When the user subsequently visits a website,
the browser would then inform the site of the user's preferences in
the course of loading the website onto the user's machine.'0 Based on
these preferences, the website's computer can determine the amount
of content to offer the user. If a user programs the browser in a way
that shows she is uncomfortable offering any personal information to
a site, she would receive minimal access to the webpage's content.
Conversely, the user could actually volunteer information (an option
that is not available in the current online protocols) in exchange for
total access or other compensation such as discount coupons for
products.
This model will also require minimal new legislation. All the
government would need to do to foster this system would be to
ensure that the technology is adopted and that agreements made
between the users and websites are enforceable. For online privacy,
the ultimate goal that policymakers should strive towards is to
optimize Internet use. The web provides formidable cost savings for
many industries, as well as consumers. Costs are lower to maintain a
website than a traditional business, and online companies do not
require the same inventory. To the extent that industries are able to
take advantage of these benefits, the overall global economy can be
improved.
The online community can also enjoy many benefits from the
services marketers provide. Targeted advertisements are more
efficient than "carpet bombing" every consumer with the same
generic commercials. Sellers can focus their resources on those buyers
most in purchasing what the seller has to offer. A byproduct of the
10. Before a web page can be displayed on a browser, the website's server must
receive certain information from the user's computer. This information includes the
computer's web address, processing capabilities, screen size and browser type. For a more
detailed description of how these communications work please see the Internet Society
website at www.isoc.org.
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improved marketing is that advertisers are better able to subsidize
websites. Many of the most popular websites are currently available
at no cost for visitors because the sites are supported by advertising
dollars. The growth of the Internet can be attributed, at least in part,
to marketers' willingness to pay premiums to move their targeted
advertising online. These premiums have enabled websites to stay in
business - even after the notorious dotcom bust.
The growth in electronic commerce has fallen short of its full
potential, however, because many users - and potential users -
continue to be apprehensive about their privacy. Surveys consistently
find that online privacy is one of the most significant issues for
Internet consumers." These concerns can lead many people to steer
away from the Internet and the resulting observation that occurs
online. If a more secure environment could be established, these
consumers would be more willing to transact online and the Internet
could grow to its full potential. For this to happen however, online
transactions need to be better tailored to account for consumers'
privacy preferences. If each user could receive their optimal level of
online privacy, the Internet would truly live up to its potential as a
mechanism of commerce. An automated transaction could help foster
this increased security.
By setting optimal use as the goal, the government may be able
to avoid the impossible task of finding an exact description of privacy.
Additionally, the legislature will not have to force one version of
privacy on a public with diverse beliefs about the subject. Instead,
policymakers can turn their focus away from these difficult tasks and
towards the mission of addressing both the financial concerns of
marketers and the doubts about privacy held by many users.
11. See, e.g., Joseph Turow, Lauren Feldman & Kimberly Meltzer, Open to
Exploitation: American Shoppers Online and Offline 4, (June 2005) (finding that 79% of
respondents to their survey agree that they are nervous about websites having information
about them), available at http://www.annenbergpublicpolicycenter.org/
04_info society/TurowAPPC_ReportWEBFINAL.pdf (last visited June 1, 2005);
Joseph Turow, Americans and Online Privacy: The System is Broken 16 (June 2003)
(finding that 76% of internet users who designate themselves as beginners, 74% who
designate themselves as intermediates and 70% of internet users who designate
themselves as advanced users agree with the statement 'I am nervous about websites
having information about me'), available at http://www.appcpenn.org/reports/2003/turow-
privacy-no-cover.pdf (last visited May 26, 2005); see also Opinion Surveys: What
Consumers Have to Say About Information Privacy: Before the Subcommittee On
Commerce, Trade, and Consumer Protection of the House Committee On Energy and
Commerce, 107th Cong. 14-19 (May 8, 2001) (statement of Dr. Alan Westin, Professor,
Columbia University) (stating that nine out of ten Americans are concerned about
potential misuse of their information).
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Hence, the best solution results when both users and businesses
can decide the value for privacy between themselves. Ideally,
websites should utilize available technology to decide in conjunction
with each user a value for that person's personal information.
Websites and users could decide for themselves how much data
collection and privacy is worth. The two parties could then negotiate
to find an equilibrium value. According to the Coase theorem, the
final arrangement should be the most efficient allocation of privacy
between the parties.
12
At its most basic the Coase theorem assumes, however, that a
negotiation has no transaction costs. 1 3 In contrast, if each business had
to negotiate with each visitor to its site separately, communication
costs would be enormous. Fortunately, because this problem arises in
a technological environment, technology may also be used to help
alleviate the problem. Because automation will significantly reduce
the transaction costs for each exchange a mutually beneficial
exchange will result, as Coase predicts.'
To simplify the process for users and further lower transaction
costs, the browser could offer a menu of privacy options. The user
could simply answer a series of questions when installing the browser.
These settings will then be used as the starting point for the
automated negotiation with the website. An important feature will be
the system's flexibility. Users will be able to change their settings at
any time they choose. A consumer could initially set their browser to
provide complete protection for their personal information. As the
consumer visits websites, however, she may become unhappy with the
amount of content to which she is provided access. User would be
able to reevaluate the worth they place on their privacy and readjust
their browser's settings accordingly. Eventually, the user will reach a
point at which her interest in privacy and desire for access to
information are balanced. Users would no longer need to adjust the
settings on their browser once they reach the point where additional
content is not worth the sacrifice of more personal privacy.
The government would also need to help foster the negotiation.
To help ensure users' security, the government should create a cause
of action against websites that violate the terms of the agreement
between the sites and the users. Currently, the Federal Trade
12. Ronald Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960).
13. Robert Cooter & Thomas Ulen, LAW & ECONOMICS 101 n.11 (4th ed., Addison
Wesley 2003).
14. See Coase, supra note 12, at 7.
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Commission will bring actions against websites that violate their
posted privacy policies.15 Unfortunately, the threat of suit holds very
little bite for websites under the current system because no
restrictions govern the contents of their posted policies.'" Often the
websites do not actually offer any protection for users, which is
usually explicitly stated in the policies. However, it is generally too
much effort for most users to review the policy for each site they visit.
The privacy and security benefits of the automated system arise
because in order to attract traffic, websites may need to agree to
increase their privacy protection for many consumers. Once the sites
come to an agreement with the user, the site will have to comply with
the terms of the bargain or be the target of lawsuits. The result will be
improved security for consumer information.
The system will also help eliminate consumer distrust of the
online market. Trust has been shown to help economies operate more
efficiently." The Internet can be viewed as its own economic system,"
and as such, improving trust will enhance the efficiency of the market.
When consumers trust the privacy practices of the websites they visit,
they will be more willing to conduct business on those sites. Further,
the websites will not need to expend scarce resources on convincing
consumers their information is secure.
Automated negotiations will help increase trust on the website
side as well. Frequently, users use fictitious names and information to
try and confuse marketers and protect their actual identities." If
15. The FTC can bring privacy actions under Section 5 of the Federal Trade
Commission Act against companies that fail to uphold promises made in their privacy
policies. Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 41-58 (2004).
16. In fact, since 1999 the FTC has brought only 14 privacy actions under Section 5 of
the FTC Act. See http://www.ftc.gov/privacy/privacyinitiatives/promises_enf.html for a list
of cases brought by the FTC.
17. For example, the privacy policy at cnn.com states when ordering products,
consumers may enter personally identifiable information such as their name, address and
phone number. Use of certain services will be restricted for consumers who do not
volunteer this information. In addition, the site allows consumers to enter information
about other people. The cnn.com privacy policy also collects non-personally identifiable
information that the user does not enter voluntarily. The statement provides that cnn.com
can share the information it collects with other companies that do not comply with the
cnn.com privacy policy. Cnn.com Privacy Statement available at
http://www.cnn.com/privacy.html (last visited May 27,2005).
18. Stephen Knack & Philip Keefer, Does Social Capital Have an Economic Payoff?
A Cross-Country Investigation, 112 Q.J. ECON. 1251 (1997).
19. See, e.g., Internet Economics (Lee W. McKnight & Joseph P. Baily, eds., 1998).
20. See, e.g., Jessica Litman, Cyberspace and Privacy: A New Legal Paradigm? 52
STAN. L. REV. 1283, 1285-86 (2000) (listing methods that people may take to confuse data
collectors such as using variations of their name and using work addresses).
HASTINGS COMM/ENT L.J. [28:101
I ALWAYS FEEL LIKE SOMEONE IS WATCHING ME
consumers agree to provide certain kinds of data and the ways that
data can be put to use, they are less likely to go through the effort of
falsifying their information. The data collectors can then be more
confident that the data they have collected is accurate. Overall, by
eliminating distrust in both users and marketers, an automated
transaction will improve the efficiency of the electronic market.
Part II of this paper will discuss the current system and the
problems it presents. The section will describe academic and political
solutions that have been proposed and then analyze why these
resolutions have not been able to solve the problem. Part III will
provide a detailed explanation of my content-for-privacy automated
solution. Both the technological and legal aspects of the system will
be analyzed. Finally, the discussion will address the benefits this
system can provide over the current model (or lack thereof).
H. Development of Online Profiling
and Attempts at Regulation
The widespread outcry about online privacy began in the late
1990's when one of the largest Internet advertiser -DoubleClick, Inc.
- acquired an offline direct marketer named Abacus Direct, Inc.
21
DoubleClick is an Internet advertiser that tracks users online and can
then post targeted advertisements across their assembled network of
different websites Similarly, Abacus collects information about
consumers' offline habits and uses this data to target direct postal
marketing mailings.23 Even prior to the merger, many privacy
advocates had already taken issue with DoubleClick's data collection
practices.2' However, the issue had not gathered much widespread
attention from consumers for several reasons. First, the information
21. Bob Tedeschi, E-Commerce Report: DoubleClick is Seeking Ways to Use Online
and Offline Data and Protect Users'Anonymity, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 29, 2001, at C9.
22. The DoubleClick website explains that one of DoubleClick's marketing products
consists of "databases [that] contain transactional data with detailed information on
consumer and business purchasing and spending behavior." The site goes on to explain
that "[b]y combining pooled transactional data with proprietary modeling techniques,
[DoubleClick] help[s] direct marketers profitably identify, acquire and retain customers in
order to operate and grow their business." See http://www.doubleclick.com/us/products/
directmarketing/.
23. See Courtney Macavinta, DoubleClick, Abacus Merge in $1.7 Billion Deal, CNET
News.com, available at http://news.com.com/2100-1023-233526.html?legacy=cnet&tag=st.
ne.1005-200-1534533 (Nov. 24, 1999) (stating that prior to the merger with DoubleClick,
Abacus owned two billion personally identifiable consumer catalog transactions) (last
visited May 29, 2005).
24. 1998 FTC REPORT, supra note 4 (citing surveys that show that consumers may be
avoiding the Internet rather than providing personal information to websites).
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that online marketers collected was anonymous and only associated
with a computer -- not with a particular user. 2' Second, many users
were completely unaware of the practice.26 With the merger, public
attention focused on DoubleClick and online advertising.
Scrutiny increased because at approximately the same time as
the merger, DoubleClick altered its privacy policy to allow
association of the previously nameless information it collected with
identifiable data.27 Privacy advocates feared that not only would
DoubleClick collect personally identifiable information on the
Internet, but that this information would also be combined with data
about consumers' offline habits as well.2 After being contacted about
privacy concerns by the FTC and several state Attorneys General,
DoubleClick announced that it was no longer planning on combining
its on and offline databases.29
Later the same year, the bankruptcy ofFoysmart.com
contributed to the swelling consumer fears over privacy.? Prior to its
25. See Courtney Macavinta, Privacy Fears Raised by DoubleClick Database Plans,
CNET NEWS.COM, Jan. 25, 2000, available at http://news.com.com/2100-1023-
236092.html?legacy=cnet&tag=st.ne.1002.bgif%3fst.ne.fd.gif.j. ("Until recently,
DoubleClick's policy was to not correlate personal information with its 100 million
cookies, which are scattered worldwide.")
26. Turow, Feldman & Meltzer, supra note 11; Turow, supra note 11.
27. Prior to the change, DoubleClick's policy read, "All users who receive an ad
targeted by DoubleClick's technology remain completely anonymous. We do not sell or
rent any information to third parties." After the change the policy read, "DoubleClick
does, however, collect certain non-personally-identifiable information about you ... Upon
completion of the merger, should DoubleClick ever match the non-personally-identifiable
information collected by DoubleClick with Abacus' database information, DoubleClick
will revise this Privacy Statement to accurately reflect its modified data collection and data
use policies and ensure that you have adequate notice of any changes and a choice to
participate." See Complaint and Request for Injunction, Request for Investigation and for
Other Relief at 4-6, In the Matter of DoubleClick, Inc. (2000) (discussing the change in
DoubleClick's privacy policy), available at
http://www.epic.org/privacy/internet/ftc/DCLK-complaint.pdf; see also Electronic Privacy
Information Center, http://www.epic.org/privacy/doubletrouble/ (last visited May 29, 2005)
for a list of articles chronicling the DoubleClick merger with Abacus.
28. Closing Letter from Joel Winston, Acting Associate Director, Division of
Financial Practices, FTC, to Christine Varney, Attorney for DoubleClick, File No. 002
3122 (Jan. 22, 2001) (closing the FTC investigation of DoubleClick's merger with Abacus
Direct) (on file with the FTC), available at http://www.ftc.gov/
os/closings/staffldoubleclick.pdf (last visited May 29, 2005).
29. Matthew C. Keck, Cookies, the Constitution, and the Common Law: A
Framework for the Right of Privacy on The Internet, 13 ALB. L.J. ScI. & TECH. 83, 91
(2002).
30. FTC v. Toysmart.com, LLC, Civil Action No. 00-11341-RGS, 2000 WL 34016434
(D. Mass. July 21, 2000) (enforcing a settlement order with the FTC in which
Toysmart.com agrees to delete all customer information in their possession).
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demise, the website had been assembling a database containing
detailed information about its customers." Despite a privacy policy to
the contrary, the company sold the information to help pay off its
creditors." The FTC sued Toysmart.com to prevent the distribution
of its information. The case was eventually settled, but the damage
to consumer confidence had already been done.3'
Spurred to action by these events and growing complaints from
consumer advocates, the FTC and the U.S. Department of Commerce
held several workshops with the largest online marketers to
investigate these growing problems. The workshops resulted in two
reports from the FTC to Congress.35 The final conclusion proposed by
these reports was that the industry should try to self-regulate before
any legislative action took place.36 In response, the advertisers formed
a trade group called the Network Advertisers Initiative to monitor
the industry's attempts at privacy reform. 7
Unfortunately, this attempt at self-regulation is now widely
viewed as an abject failure.38 Data gathering has not decreased and
consumers do not feel any more secure. Congress has repeatedly tried
to pass legislation addressing these growing problems, but to no
avail.39 Without any legislative action, the courts have been left to try
31. Id. at *1 (FTC complaint alleges that Toysmart.com collected customer
information and the privacy policy stated that the company would not offer to sell the
information to third parties).
32. Id. (FTC complaint alleges that Toysmart.com engaged in deceptive practices by




35. 1998 Frc REPORT, supra note 24; Federal Trade Commission, Privacy Online: A
Report to Congress Part 2 Recommendations (July 2000) [hereinafter 2000 FTC REPORT],
available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2000/07/onlineprofiling.pdf.
36. 2000 FTC REPORT, supra note 35.
37. See Network Advertising Initiative, available at
http://www.networkadvertising.org/aboutnai-nai.asp (last visited May 30, 2005).
38. Litman, supra note 20, at 1286-87 ("Industry self-regulation, of course, has got us
where we are today. Studies of how well it is working confirm what one would expect: It
works far better at enhancing commerce in personal data than it does in protecting
personal data privacy."); see also Chris Jay Hoofnagle, Electronic Privacy Information
Control, Privacy Self Regulation: A Decade of Disappointment (Mar. 4, 2005) (explaining
why self-regulation has not worked and how the government needs to provide a better
solution), available at http://www.epic.org/reports/decadedisappoint.pdf (last visited May
30, 2005).worked and how the government needs to provide a better solution), available at
http://www.epic.org/reports/decadedisappoint.pdf (last visited May 30, 2005).
39. See Center for Democracy and Technology, available at
http://www.cdt.org/legislation/0/3/.
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to deal with the predicament on their own.4° Unfortunately, the
judicial branch of the government is ill-equipped to confront these
proliferating difficulties. Courts operate on a case-by-case basis;
however, a larger policy may result from - or at least be influenced by
- the judicial decisions.4 ' Because of the lack of control and
uncertainty regarding online privacy, there have been many calls on
Congress to create some sort of policy on the subject. 2
A. Profiling and Advertising
Before any alternative solutions can be explored, it is first
necessary to understand the precise nature of marketers' information-
gathering behaviors. To appropriate the value of consumer
information, online marketers have developed innovative
technologies to harvest the data. 3 One of the primary concerns about
these technological advances is not their ability to track a user on a
single website, but to assemble profiles of each user across many
40. Keck, supra note 29, at 93.
41. Id.
42. See discussion infra Part C.
43. Before 1994, website servers were not able to identify a particular user. Schwartz,
supra note 2. Until "that moment in Web history, every visit to a site was like the first,
with no automatic way to record that a visitor had dropped by before. Any commercial
transaction would have to be handled from start to finish in one visit, and visitors would
have to work their way through the same clicks again and again; it was like visiting a store
where the shopkeeper had amnesia." Id. That year, a programmer for a company soon to
be known as Netscape invented a technology, called a cookie, which allowed websites to
identify each individual computer that visited the site.
To understand the operation of a cookie, one must first recognize that to display a web
page, a user's computer must communicate with the server that contains that information.
During this communication, the website's server can place a small text file on the user's
hard drive. This file, the cookie, contains a code unique to the user's computer and
possibly other logon information, such as any password the user needs for that website.
The next time the user's computer views the website, that site's server will recognize the
cookie and thereby identify the viewing computer. Once the website server identifies the
user's computer it can then begin to collect information about the user's habits while
visiting the site.
A website's ability to record such information offers several benefits to the user. For
instance, cookies allow users to discontinue an online operation in mid-stream and then
complete the undertaking on a subsequent visit to the site without repeating already
completed steps. Another convenience is the possibility of one-click purchasing; in this
case the website's server retains the user's purchasing information, such as a credit card
number and shipping address, from one transaction to the next. The user, therefore, only
has to select the item s/he wishes to purchase to complete the transaction.
Cookies also allow the consumer to benefit from customized web pages. Web "portals"
such as American Online, Yahoo! and Netscape can provide information preferred by a
particular user such as local news, weather, sports scores, stock quotes, etc. By allowing
the website to tag the user's computer with a cookie that is pre-programmed self-
identification, the user needs only to link to that site to receive pre-selected information.
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unrelated sites.' Advertisers contract with multiple websites, each of
which permits the collection of information concerning visitors to the
site.4 ' The advertiser is then able to compile the information it collects
from various sites into a single dossier or profile.46 The resulting
profiles can consist of hundreds of discrete data points about an
individual. As an online advertiser collects more information about a
particular web user, it becomes better able to narrowly target
advertisements to that user's personal preferences and tastes.
User-specific targeted advertising is essentially a more focused
version of traditional advertising methods. Offline, advertisers
conduct marketing surveys to determine a consumer's likelihood to
purchase its product. Advertisers, then, select a medium and location,
such as a particular television show, with a demographic that most
matches their ideal consumer.
Demographic-based marketing is constrained, however, by two
factors. First, the marketer cannot target a precise consumer from the
group that fits the relevant demographic. Second, it is difficult to
determine which advertisements are most effective. 7 Online profiling
has given the marketers the ability to overcome both obstacles. The
detailed consumer profiles advertisers can collect online allow them
to target their marketing to specific individuals who are most likely to
be interested in their product. Additionally, because advertisers can
track potential customers (i.e., match viewers of ads with purchasers
of the product), they can determine the effectiveness of any particular
advertisement. In these two ways, online profiling can make
marketing much more effective.'
44. See 2000 FTC REPORT, supra note 35 at 3 (noting that online advertisers act in a
manner that is almost invisible to consumers to collect information from multiple sites in
order to put together a profile from which they can predict future consumer behavior).
45. See, e.g., Abacus, available at http://www.abacus-
us.com/about_abacus/abacus-overview/, which explains that one of DoubleClick's
alliances consists "of over 1,550 catalog, online, and retail merchants offering shared data
representing over 90 million households."
46. 2000 FTC REPORT, supra note 35, at 3.
47. Hence, the old advertising adage that an advertiser knows that half of its budget
is wasted, it is just not sure which half.
48. Somewhat paradoxically, this ability to track the effectiveness of particular ads
may have also led to the decline in online advertising since the late 1990's. Whereas
offline, anytime sales go up, it can be inferred that certain advertisements had a role in
that increase, online this inference can be measured directly. Since most online
advertisements only had a small number of people click through them, it was assumed
these were the only customers the advertisements were influencing. Once the marketers
saw the low click-through numbers they decreased their online advertising budget.
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It is extremely important to note, however, that despite this
ability to create online user profiles, the information collected is
generally not associated with any specific person. 9 The profile
represents a pattern of usage, and is linked only to an identification
code placed on a computer, not to the specific user." The data found
in this sort of anonymous profile are known as Non-Personally
Identifiable Information (Non-PII).' Several ways exist, however, to
link the profile to a specific person, and thus, the profile becomes
Personally Identifiable Information (PII).5 2 For example, if the user
enters her name into a form on the website to make a purchase, the
site can then connect the name with the user's previously anonymous
profile.
Online advertisers can, therefore, create enormous databases of
user information, both with and without P11. Some of the largest
online advertisers have thousands of different websites as part of their
network, including most of the sites with the majority of online
traffic. 3 Although online profiling is usually associated with network
advertising agencies, "[n]ot all profiles are constructed by network
advertising companies (also known as online profilers). Some
websites create profiles of their own customers based on their
interactions. Other companies create profiles as part of a service - for
example, offering discounts on particular products, or providing
references to Web sites displaying the same topic as those already
visited by the consumer."4 Online profilers with even greater reach
are Internet Service Providers (ISP's), such as America Online.5
Because ISP's are able to track users the entire time they are logged
on to their service, the ISP can compile extraordinarily thorough
information about their consumers' interests and online habits.
Specialists are then able to "analyze demographic, media, survey,
purchasing and psychographic data to determine the exact groups
49. See, e.g., the DoubleClick privacy statement at
http://www.doubleclick.com/us/about-doubleclick/privacy/ (stating that no personal
information is used by DoubleClick to deliver advertisements)-
50. See 1998 FrC REPORT, supra note 4.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. In re DoubleClick, Inc. Privacy Litig., 154 F. Supp. 2d 497, 502 (S.D.N.Y.
2001)("DoubleClick is affiliated with over 11,000 Web sites for which and on which it
provides targeted banner advertisements."); see also Abacus website, supra note 45.
54. 2000 FTC REPORT, supra note 35, at 1 n.4.
55. See, e.g., Litman supra note 20, at 1305 (describing a case in which the ISP
America Online changed their privacy policy with little notice, and then contracted to sell
subscribers' telephone numbers to third-party telemarketers.)
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that are most likely to buy specific products and services.
Psychographic profiling is also referred to in the industry as
'behavioral profiling.' 1
56
B. The Efficiency Lost from Profiling in the Current System
The harvesting of personal information can substantially benefit
both marketers and consumers. Marketers ensure that their efforts
are focused on the consumers who are most interested in their
products, while users avoid generic promotions for which they have
no interest. For users who continue to avoid the Internet, however,
the privacy threat well-surpasses these benefits. " Many consumers
use the Internet at a sub-optimal level due to several economic
factors, such as an unproductive amount of advertising, an
unreasonable all-or-nothing choice in terms of privacy, and a loss of
trust.
1. Marketers Both Over- and Under-Produce Advertising
Profiling represents a substantial invasion of consumer privacy,
yet consumers are not compensated for this loss. Data collection has
two primary costs: the actual financial expense as well as the
emotional toll consumers suffer when their privacy is invaded. The
marketer pays the initial price for the data-collection and selection of
targeted advertisements. Nonetheless, marketers do not pay for the
accompanying loss of privacy, and the price can be substantial. Unlike
situations offline where a person needs to leave home before he or
she can be observed, surveillance online occurs in the most private
spaces, such as kitchens, living rooms and bedrooms." Currently,
marketers underpay for their data because they do not pay for this
diminished privacy. This discounted price allows collectors to gather
more data than they could otherwise afford if they had paid in full.
Further, profiling generates both over- and under-production of
targeted ads. Overproduction results when users receive targeted
advertisements but would prefer a subscription service to sacrificing
privacy. For these consumers, a more efficient online situation would
allow a choice between paying for access to a site and receiving
advertising that subsidizes the site's costs. Efficiency could be further
enhanced by allowing a graded system in which consumers could
decide on different ratios of advertising to subscription payments.
56. 2000 FTC REPORT, supra note 35, at 5 (internal citations omitted).
57. See sources cited supra note 8.
58. See sources cited supra notes 8 and 11.
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Conversely, too few advertisements are sometimes generated.
Underproduction of targeted ads results when consumers would
prefer to offer private information in return for specific marketing but
cannot. For example, a consumer who is currently in the market for a
new car may be willing to supply her preferences in automobiles in
return for promotions informing her about the car market. Many car
dealers would probably also be willing to pay for the information
about potential customers. As a result, the dealer would not waste
resources locating an interested audience and the consumer would
receive ads to which she is receptive. Presently, no method exists that
enables consumers to easily alert companies of their preferences. For
a consumer to alert advertisers of her preferences, she needs to visit a
car dealer's website and hope that the advertisers will correctly
interpret the resulting "clickstream" data.59
2. The Unreasonable All-Or-Nothing Choice
A related source of underproduction stems from consumers with
minimal privacy concerns that would willingly sell information.
Advertisers value demographic information and some might pay for
more detailed data than they can gather on their own. Unfortunately,
a venue for this market is not readily available. Consequently,
consumers and advertisers may be ready to transact but cannot find a
ready marketplace.
Parties facing the problem of inefficient data collection are left
with an unreasonable all-or-nothing choice. It is virtually impossible
for consumers to block all the technology that data collectors use to
harvest consumer information. ° Therefore, consumers must decide to
59. "Clickstream" is a commonly used term used to describe the "digital footprints"
left behind when a person moves through the Internet.
60. Cookies are relatively easy to block through most browsers, although many
websites do not operate effectively if they cannot place and read cookies on the user's
system. There are other technologies, such as web bugs and spyware that are not nearly as
easy to stop. The web bug, a small graphic embedded into the background of a web page,
is increasingly popular. See Stephanie Olsen, Web Bug Swarm Grows 500 Percent, CNET
NEWS.COM, Aug. 14, 2001, at http://news.com.con/2100-1023-271605.html. Web bugs use
the same technology that displays images on web pages. In normal operation, a website's
internal code contains information that directs the user's computer to retrieve the image
to be displayed from a specified location on the website server or any computer linked to
the Internet. The retrieval instructions also direct the user's computer to send information
about that computer that permits the web server to send an image of the correct size and
configuration.
The web bug is an extension of this standard process of image display. Attached to the
retrieve command for even a single pixel are instructions to send additional information to
the server. Because such a small display creates no noticeable image on the screen, web
bugs are sometimes called "clear" GIFS (Graphics Interchange Format). See Sean
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allow marketers' surveillance or maintain their privacy by remaining
offline. Regrettably, choosing privacy inevitably results in either a
reduction in Internet use or, in many cases, avoidance of the web
altogether. Many users, however, when properly informed about the
benefits connected with some data collection, may elect an
intermediate option. The consumer surplus available from users who
remain offline but would favor an intermediary alternative is lost in
this all-or-nothing paradigm.
3. Loss of Trust Online
Perhaps the gravest consequence from profiling is that it fosters
distrust online. Because users are not generally aware of marketers'
methods of collection and distribution, many feel insecure about
surfing the web. This anxiety increases every time the media reports
stories extolling the dangers of personal information that has been
bought, sold or stolen.61 Overall, data collection, coupled with the lack
of privacy protection, decreases consumer trust online.
Recently, economists have demonstrated that higher levels of
trust in a community are generally associated with more efficiency in
the related economy. For example, trust can be associated with higher
productivity because "[i]ndividuals in higher-trust societies spend less
to protect themselves from being exploited in economic
transactions."62 Government policy regarding online privacy directly
Donahue, GIF Tiff, Business 2.0, December 1999, at
http://ecompany.com/articles/mag/0,1640,13282,FF.html?ref=cnet. Specifically, "[t]he Web
bug sends back to its home server (which can belong to the host site, a network advertiser
or some other third party): the IP (Internet Protocol) address of the computer that
downloaded the page on which the bug appears; the URL (Uniform Resource Locator) of
the page on which the Web bug appears; the URL of the Web bug image; the time the
page containing the Web bug was viewed; the type of browser that fetched the Web bug;
and the identification number of any cookie on the consumer's computer previously
placed by that server." 2000 FTC REPORT, supra note 35, at 3 n.12. Additionally, the web
bug can place a cookie on the user's computer that configures itself to the user's email
address, thereby making all the information collected from the cookie identifiable. Id.
Because web bugs are invisible to the naked eye, the only way a user can detect a web bug
is to search the website's source code for a single pixel image embedded in the
programming, or to download special detection software. See Stephanie Olsen, Privacy
Group Shines Light on Web Bugs, CNET NEWS.COM, June 7, 2001,
http://news.com.com/2100-1023-268055.html.
61. See, e.g., FrC v. Toysmart.com, LLC, Civil Action No. 00-11341-RGS, 2000 WL
34016434 (D. Mass. July 21, 2000); Tom Zeller Jr., The Scramble to Protect Personal
Information, NY TIMES.COM, June 9, 2005,
http://www.nytimes.com/2005/06/09/business/09data.html?oref=login (reporting on the
ways in which personal information collected by businesses have been stolen).
62. Knack & Keefer, supra note 18, at 2. When individual trust is higher, fewer
transactional terms need to be expressed in written contracts and litigation is less frequent.
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bears on the level of trust associated with Internet transactions.
"Whereas firms have incentives to abuse their access to privileged
information, their desire for future deals requires the trust of
consumers who don't fear their information will be stolen or
abused."63 Hence, if users feel that their personal information is
secure, they will be more inclined to use the Internet.
Because users do not have enough faith in the websites they visit,
people are confronted with added costs as they attempt to protect
their privacy. For instance, many people use pseudonyms, 6' or resort
to other deceptive tactics such as supplying different home addresses,
using incorrect email addresses and providing incorrect consumer
interests.65 Not only is this effort inefficient but also ineffective. The
pretexts are not efficient because resources are expended that could
be spent more productively if privacy were valued correctly. The
ploys are ineffective because there are many ways to collect data and
marketers will usually uncover the correct facts eventually. The final
result would be that the consumer will still receive advertising, but the
ads will not be of any interest.
Increased trust can prove beneficial for web businesses as well.
Once users feel more secure, they will visit more sites and conduct
more transactions online; overall Internet traffic will grow.
Companies would not spend as much to assure their customers if a
standard level of protection were the social norm. Businesses could
use these savings to reduce prices or to develop new products. If users
could control the ways in which their information was used then they
would not be as wary. Hence, provision of protection for information
is a wealth enhancing good for both users and businesses. However,
online privacy will never be optimally equilibrated under the existing
all-or-nothing paradigm, and the attendant cost is underutilization of
the web.
Id. at 3. Importantly, societies with high levels of trust also require fewer institutions to
enforce the terms of transactions. Id. To the extent that the society spends less on
protection, it can increase expenditures on innovation and other more productive
activities. Id.
63. Avner Ben-Ner & Louis Putterman, Trusting and Trustworthiness, 81 B.U.L. Rev.
523, 539 (2001).
64. See Litman, supra note 20, at 1290 (citing Avrahami v. U.S. News & World
Report, Inc., No. 96-203, 1996 WL 1065557, at *2 (Va. Cir. Ct. June 13, 1996) (finding that
defendant used at least 19 different names in making purchases)).
65. Id. at 1285-86.
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C. Privacy Theories - Off and Online
The conundrum presented by the issue of online privacy and
marketers profiling behavior has attracted considerable scholarly
attention. Ever since Warren and Brandies published their path-
breaking article that first recognized "a right to be left alone,"6 6 legal
scholars have attempted to define the boundaries of this right." These
attempts have created an almost incomprehensible array of
definitions and values for privacy. At one end of the spectrum is the
claim that privacy is inalienable and should be granted to all citizens
regardless of that citizen's personal perceived value for their privacy.6
At the other end of the continuum is the belief that people only want
it when they have something to hide.69 Within this spectrum, most of
the literature tends to be biased in favor of granting a rather extensive
privacy right. As Thomas Murphy noted, since scholars tend to favor
privacy "a large portion of the literature - both popular and scholarly
- consists of articles extolling the virtues of privacy and bemoaning
the absence of judicial and statutory protection. "'o
The disparate interpretations of even the simple definition of
privacy may lead to the conclusion that legislating privacy is
impossible. Legislation requires community values, yet the
community does not seem able to agree on the importance of privacy.
Nevertheless, because so many people view online privacy as a major
66. Samuel Warren & Louis Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193,
193-96 (1890) (explaining the evolution of the right to privacy).
67. See, e.g., discussion infra Parts 1, 2, 3.
68. See, e.g., Cal. Const. Art. I, § 1 (listing privacy among specific inalienable rights
enjoyed by all people).
69. By conducting an economic analysis of privacy, Judge Richard Posner came to
the conclusion that there should not be an allocation of property rights over an
individual's personal information because the primary reason to keep information private
is to misrepresent oneself. Richard A. Posner, The Right to Privacy, 12 GA. L. REV. 393,
407 (1978). According to this view, the only reason people want control over the spread of
true facts is to commit fraud - either social or financial. Privacy protection encourages
fraud. "The more (accurate) information is available, and the cheaper that information is
to obtain, the more beneficial transactions will occur. In the market context, if disclosure
of information is inhibited, the decision to transact will be made either with second-rate
information or with information obtained at a higher cost. The same holds true in the
social 'market,' except with different terminology." Richard S. Murphy, Property Rights in
Personal Information: An Economic Defense of Privacy, 84 GEO. L.J. 2381, 2386 (1996).
Seemingly paradoxically, economic analysis leads to the conclusion that while individuals
should not receive privacy protection, businesses should. While individuals try to hide
information in an attempt to deceive, businesses hide information as part of development,
as in trade secret law. By removing protection from businesses, the government would be
taking away an incentive to create. Posner, supra.
70. Murphy, supra note 69, at 2381.
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71concern, there have been many attempts to place legal control over
the collection and dissemination of personal information.7 ' These
attempts have failed, however, due partly to a general lack of
enthusiasm among legislators to pass laws that govern the Internet. 7
Additionally, the proposals have not been able to overcome the
difficult task in defining what protections to give.7 ' To try to address
this legislative impasse, a surge of articles attempting to deal with the
specific problem of privacy online have emerged. Three of the most
popular theories are the property rights approach, the tort law
approach and the European Union approach.
1. The Property Rights Approach
Recently, one of the most popular proposals is to grant a
property right over personal information. Once the property right is
created, people should be able to control their information. Although
the privacy as property argument is not new, the resistance towards
regulating both the Internet and privacy has helped generate renewed
interest in the concept.76 Recent Congressional attempts at legislating
privacy in other contexts have drawn wide criticism.77 The property
rights solution has gained momentum because it can help solve the
71. See sources cited supra notes 8 and 11.
72. Schwartz, supra note 2 ("In Washington, at least 50 privacy- related bills are
awaiting consideration, though the current leadership in the House has focused its
attention on privacy invasions by government, not by private business."); see also
http://www.cdt.org/legislation/0/3/ for a list of privacy-related proposals.
73. This reluctance stems from several different sources. The most obvious reasons
are that laws governing the Internet are difficult to enforce, would demand extensive
resources and would give a false sense of security. Internet Privacy and Electronic
Communications: Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Courts and Intellectual Property of
the House Committee on the Judiciary, 105th Cong. 25-26 (1998) (statement of David L.
Aaron, Under Secretary, International Trade Administration, Department of Commerce),
available at http://judiciary.house.gov/legacy/41176.htm. There are also philosophical
reasons why the government should not pass laws for the Internet specifically. See, e.g.,
Frank H. Easterbrook, Cyberspace and the Law of the Horse, 1996 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 207
(1996) (arguing that it is more efficient to allow traditional law to govern issues arising
online than to create a new set of laws that pertain only to cyberspace). Finally, there are
very practical reasons, such as intense industry lobbying, why the government has been
slow to enact any regulation over the Internet. Lawrence Lessig, The Architecture of
Privacy, 1 VAND. J. ENT. L. & PRAC. 56 (1999) ("The reasons for this lack of law in
America protecting privacy are complex.., one set relates to the extraordinary lobbying
power of interests that would use the data affected by informational privacy
regulation .... ).
74. See Lessig, supra note 73.
75. Littman, supra note 20, at 1287-88.
76. Id.
77. See infra note 193.
[28:101
I ALWAYS FEEL LIKE SOMEONE IS WATCHING ME
problem without undue government intrusion into the realm of
privacy or the web. Once the right is declared, standard property and
contract law can take over.
Professor Lawrence Lessig has taken the property rights
approach one-step further. According to Professor Lessig,
assignment of a property right is only the first piece of the solution;
technological controls over personal information must also be put in
place.79 Professor Lessig envisions a system where privacy preferences
can be entered into an automated "privacy butler" which can then
negotiate with websites and marketers automatically. 80 To ensure the
system works, entitlement to the property rights for personal
information must initially be allocated to the user.81 Users should then
have control over their own information.
The idea of a property right has not won over all scholars;
indeed, it has several drawbacks. For example, creating a property
right in personal information means that people can control that
information. However, anytime someone can control information
there is a potential conflict with First Amendment principles.8 Once
information can be restricted, freedom of expression can also be
restricted.83
The primary concern with the property rights proposal, however,
is that property is alienable and consumers will end up selling the
rights to their information. Most users do not ever read click-through
agreements online.8' If property rights are given for personal
information, it is very likely that data collectors will include
assignments of personal information in their click-through
agreements. Therefore, before a consumer realizes that they have
78. Lawrence Lessig, Code and Other Laws of Cyberspace (1999).
79. Id.
80. Paul M. Schwartz, Beyond Lessig's Code for Internet Privacy: Cyberspace Filters,
Privacy-Control, and Fair Information Practices, 2000 WIS. L. REv. 743, 750 (2000)
(discussing Professor Lessig's proposed privacy solution in which property rights to
information are assigned to the user and then technology can be used to negotiate away
these property rights).
81. Id.
82. Litman, supra note 20, at 1294 n.56
83. Id. at 1294-95.
84. A click-through or clickwrap agreement is a type of online contract where users
can simply click a digital button to manifest assent. See Specht v. Netscape
Communications Corp., 306 F.3d. 17, 22 n.4 (2d Cir. 2002) (defining clickwrap agreements
and noting that most plaintiffs in that case never read the agreement before downloading
the corresponding software); Turow, supra note 11, at 18 (concluding that most adults who
are not aware of what cookies do either do not read or do not understand the posted
privacy policies on the sites they visit).
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given up their property rights, it has been fully assigned. The
consumer will then no longer have control over the downstream
trading. The problem is compounded because property rights will
probably make this information more valuable.85 As profilers are able
to exclude their competitors from the information they collect, the
information's market value will increase.' The increased value could
encourage even more harvesting.'
2. The Tort Law Approach
An alternative approach proposed by Professor Jessica Litman
relies on tort, rather than property, law.' Just as the property rights
approach is attractive due to its grounding in traditional common law,
so is the tort law approach. As mentioned above, the trade of
personal information can violate consumer trust. 9 Many consumers
have developed an expectation that their information will not be
collected, bought or sold. Recently, some legislation has created
causes of action in the case of medical or financial information when
that trust is violated.' Advocates of the tort law approach believe
these types of causes of action should apply to every class of data
collection.9'
As Professor Litman points out, this solution has some appeal for
several reasons. First, tort law is already well established and would
not need significant modification to add a cause for invasion of
privacy to its arsenal of possible claims.92 Just as the property law
approach has an air of possibility that makes the solution more
attractive, a tort solution has some allure because of its sense of
feasibility. Second, tort law already has built-in methods through
which parties can show consent by expressing "willingness in fact that
an act or an invasion of an interest shall take place. ,93 Because one of
the primary issues involved in online privacy has been the difficulty of
85. Litman, supra note 20, at 1294-95.
86. Id. at 1295.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. See supra pp.117-19.
90. Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-102, 113 Stat. 1338 (1999)
(codified in scattered sections of 12 and 15 U.S.C.) (provides privacy protection for certain
types of financial information); Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of
1996, Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1936 (1996) (provides privacy protection for certain
types of medical information).
91. Litman, supra note 20, at 1291-92.
92. Id. at 1312-13.
93. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 10A (1965).
HASTINGS COMMfENT L.J. [28:101
I ALWAYS FEEL LIKE SOMEONE IS WATCHING ME
user consent, tort law can help by contributing a mechanism to deal
with the problem. A final advantage of tort law is that as a common
law solution, the rules can be altered to reflect changing technology
and societal attitudes about privacy."
Unfortunately, like property law, even Professor Litman admits
tort law is not a panacea for the problem of Internet privacy.9 A tort
solution ultimately relies on judicial intervention between private
parties. Courts, therefore, will be the final arbiters of privacy rights.
This solution can work, but only if consensus as to the definition and
value of privacy can be achieved. While courts may be good at
determining a community's norms, the courts place such divergent
value on their personal information that it would be virtually
impossible for a court to decide how much protection any particular
party should receive. What may be seen as a heinous invasion of
privacy to some members of a community could be a welcome
attempt to customize services to others. The courts would be left
either setting general guidelines that everyone must follow or make
decisions on a case-by-case basis, leaving future litigants uncertain of
their rights.
The court system may also have a difficult time deciding what
constitutes a breach of consumer trust. 6 Obviously, once a case gets
to court the consumer will claim their trust was violated. It is very
difficult from an ex ante position, however, to determine what sort of
implicit agreement was made between the litigants at the time of the
breach.
3. The EU Approach
A third type of privacy regime based on the privacy laws
established in the European Union has become increasingly popular.97
94. Keck, supra note 29, at 84 ("Solving the privacy debate is a task that the common
law is particularly well-suited for because it can adapt to changing views and perspectives
without requiring new legislation or regulations.").
95. Litman, supra note 20, at 1312-13 ("The features that make [the tort law]
approach plausible, however, also make it weak.").
96. Id. at 1313.
97. See, e.g., Issues in U.S.-European Union Trade: European Privacy Legislation
and Biotechnology/Food Safety Policy, Hearing Before the House Committee on
Internatioanl Relations, 105th Cong. (1998) (statement of Marc Rotenberg, Executive
Director, Electronic Privacy Information Center), available at
http://commdocs.house.gov/committees/intlrel/hfa50549.000/hfa50549_0f.htm; Rachel K.
Zimmerman, The Way the "Cookies" Crumble: Internet Privacy and Data Protection in the
Twenty-First Century, 4 N.Y.U.J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL'Y 439, 449 (2001); Marsha Cope
Huie, et al., The Right to Privacy in Personal Data: The EU Prods the U.S. and
Controversy Continues, 9 TULSA J. COMP. & INT'L L. 391 (2002).
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The European Union has been much more aggressive about
protecting privacy online and many advocates have applauded the
approach. The European Union has passed a Directive on the Privacy
of Personal Data (the "EU Directive" or the "Directive"). 9 The
Directive declares that privacy is a fundamental human right and
ensures that all member states have equivalent privacy protection."
All member states are required to pass laws creating a high level of
protection for personal information."
The European Union stresses each citizen's right to have
"information self-determination."' 10' The Directive attempts to
balance business interests with individual privacy concerns by putting
strict restrictions on the ways in which data collectors can collect
personal information.' Limits include controls over the collection of
sensitive data, such as medical information, and limitations on
collection of personal information that is not related to the purpose
for which it was initially gathered0 3 Organizations collecting
information in an EU Member State must report their activities to a
national security board."'O Clear notice must be given to individuals
when their information is being harvested.9" Citizens also have the
right to access profiles containing their personal information and
correct any errors." The Directive requires explicit user consent any
time their personal information is used in a way not contemplated
during the first collection."' Additionally, the EU Directive requires
appropriate security for the processing of personal information."'
9& Council Directive 95/46, 1995 O.J. (L281) 31(EC) [hereinafter EU Directive],
discussing the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and
on the free movement of such data.
99. Id. at 10 (noting that privacy is a fundamental human right as recognized "both in
Article 8 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms and in the general principles of Community law"); see also Julia
M. Fromholz, The European Union Data Privacy Directive, 15 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 461
(2000) (analyzing the EU Directive).
100. The EU Directive, supra note 98, at Art. 1 ("Member States shall protect the
fundamental rights and freedoms of natural persons, and in particular their right to privacy
with respect to the processing of personal data").
101. Joel R. Reidenberg, E-Commerce and Trans-Atlantic Privacy, 38 HOuS. L. REV.
717, 731 (2001).
102. Id.
103. Id. at 732.
104. Id. at 733.
105. Id. at 732.
106. Reidenberg, supra note 101, at 731.
107. Id. at 732.
108. Id. at 732-33.
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Because geographical and political borders do not bind the
Internet, the EU added provisions concerning transfer of data
between countries."°9 The Directive prohibits the transfer of data
across national borders to countries without adequate privacy
controls."0 Also, to ensure the local rules apply regardless of where
the information collector is based, choice of law provisions in the
Directive indicate that the laws of the state in which the data
harvesting takes place will apply in any legal action."'
Constitutional hurdles make it highly unlikely that the EU
directive will be adopted in the United States."' While the Directive
declared that privacy is a fundamental human right, the U.S.
Constitution places a much higher value on freedom of information.
Critics of the EU approach claim that if the laws were imported into
the United States it would run afoul of constitutional protections,
namely First Amendment protection and protection against
government takings."3 A privacy law would violate the First
Amendment if it were a government action that restricted freedom of
expression. "[W]hen privacy rights conflict with free expression rights
before the Court, the latter prevail, virtually without exception.""
4
Any law that attempts to protect privacy by restricting information
faces significant First Amendment obstacles."5
The EU Directive would face similar problems overcoming the
takings clause of the Fifth Amendment. The takings clause prohibits
the government's ability to take private property without legal due
process and just compensation."6 The prohibition has even been
extended beyond tangible property to certain kinds of stored data."7
It is debatable whether the Fifth Amendment would stop the federal
government from adopting the EU Directive, because collected
personal information has been found to be the private property of the
109. Id. at 733.
110. Id.
111. Reidenberg, supra note 101, at 733.
112. Fred H. Cate, The Changing Face of Privacy Protection in the European Union
and the United States, 33 IND. L. REV. 173, 203-9 (1999-2000) (discussing the First and
Fifth Amendment limitations to application of the EU Directive in the United States).
113. Id.
114. Id. at 204.
115. Id. at 205.
116. U.S. CONST. amend. V ("No person shall ... be deprived of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use,
without just compensation").
117. Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 87 (1984) (finding that the takings
clause applies to health, safety and environmental data cognizable as trade-secrets).
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collector."' Nonetheless, it is possible the government would be
required to compensate profilers for regulations restricting their use
of their data." 9
D. The Current Absence of Legislation
Despite the drawbacks of the standard solutions to the challenge
of online privacy, both the federal and state governments have still
proposed many legislative solutions - albeit unsuccessfully. Although
there have been several hundred different privacy related legislative
proposals brought up at the federal level and almost four times that
amount at the state level, so far, nothing related to marketers'
profiling activity has passed.' These legislative attempts have failed
for many reasons."' Chief among those is the government's general
reluctance to regulate the Internet on any issue.' Because the
Internet has been growing so rapidly - even during the economic
downturn - politicians do not want to be seen as putting obstacles in
the way of that development." The result has been very little
regulation of the Internet.
Aside from that general reluctance, however, several other
reasons account for the lack of legislative action to specifically
regulate privacy online.' Many businesses that operate online argue
that limiting personal data collection will hurt the economy, and
without proving tangible damage the harm is unnecessary.'2 5
118. See Alan E. Littmann , Comment, The Technology Split in Customer List
Interpretation, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1901, 1901 (2002) (noting that courts have treated
customer lists containing personal information as alienable).
119. Cate, supra note 112, at 207-08.
120. Keck, supra note 29, at 93; see also Jennifer O'Neill, Congress Navigates a Flood
of Net Privacy, PCworld.com, at http://www.pcworld.com/news/article/0,aid, 42002,00.asp
(Feb. 20, 2001).
121. Schwartz, supra note 2, see also Major Consumer Internet Privacy Bills in the
106th Congress, Center for Democracy and Technology [hereinafter INTERNET PRIVACY
BILLS], at http://www.cdt.org/legislation/106th/privacy/majorbills.shtml (last visited Aug.
28, 2005).
122. See, e.g., Elizabeth Hurt, What does Bush Mean for E-commerce?, at
http://www.business2.com/articles/web/0,1653,16423,00.html?ref=cnet. (there is "bipartisan
respect for an unregulated Internet as key to a healthy economy").
123. Id.
124. See Declan McCullagh & Ryan Sager, Privacy Laws: Not Gonna Happen,
WiredNews, Mar. 2, 2001, ("[A] combination of factors-including widespread
disagreement on Capitol Hill about what form legislation should take, increasingly vocal
opposition from business groups, and concern that intervention might harm the
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Advocates of this position believe that any legislation that does pass
should be narrowly tailored to fix a specific problem, and that lack of
consumer confidence is not sufficient. 6 Because there have not been
widespread actual harms associated with data collection, therefore,




Others contend that the market will correct itself without any
government intervention.128 If consumers truly value their privacy,
then they will become more educated on the topic.129 Eventually
privacy-conscious consumers will become more attracted to websites
with better protection. Conversely, if the public does not "vote with
their feet" (or eyeballs, in this case) for sites with stricter privacy
policies, then privacy may not have been as large a concern as first
suspected.
The largest current obstacle, however, is the debate over whether
legislation should fall under an opt-in or opt-out rule.13° If opt-out
regulation were adopted, then the default rule would be set to allow
data collection unless consumers specifically request out of the
system. Under an opt-in default rule, by contrast, businesses would
need to convince consumers to permit collection. Obviously, profilers
prefer the former while privacy advocates prefer the latter model.
The proposals that have gained the most attention and are viewed as
the most realistic would require commercial sites to post a privacy
policy and consumers must then decide whether or not to
participate.'
These issues are all symptoms of a more overarching dilemma,
however. Legislation is designed to represent community ideals and
values. Yet, while the community struggles to come to a consensus,
even scholars have offered little guidance because their views mirror
the divisions apparent in the rest of the public."' Not only is there an
absence of an overwhelming majority on the topic, a plurality is not
126. Id. ("'To pass privacy legislation just because it will boost consumer confidence
but undermines the economy isn't a good idea."')
127. Id.
128. See, e.g., Need for Internet Privacy Legislation: Hearing Before the Senate
Commerce, Science and Transportation Committee, 106th Cong. (2001)(statements of
Sen. John McCain)(stating a disbelief that laws are the proper way to control the
Internet).
129. Id. (stating the consumers should be informed about their personal information to
make appropriate decisions regarding their privacy).
130. McCullagh & Sager, supra note 124.
131. Id.
132. See discussion supra Part II.C.
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even present. Congress typically struggles in situations where it is
difficult or impossible to garner a clear majority - or even a plurality
- accord. So far, most legislative proposals have attempted to draw
distinctions despite this theoretical morass by establishing a specific
range of proper behavior that is deemed suitable for every member of
the public. 3 Without a clear definition for privacy, however, the
determinants of inappropriate behavior become rather arbitrary as
the value people place on their privacy may be relatively evenly
distributed across the population.
Further, these proposals will not change the inefficiency that
results from the all-or-nothing choice with which both consumers and
profilers are confronted."M Ultimately, whether the default favors
profiling or privacy, those who desire a middle ground are not given
that option. By trying to define and quantify privacy, legislatures are
ignoring people's diverse preferences.
Legislators are lodged between profilers who exhibit proven
economic benefits from their behavior, and consumers with an ill-
defined but powerful affinity for their privacy. While the government
does not want to ignore the emotional pleas for privacy protection, it
cannot deny the financial gains. This impasse has not yet been
overcome because the ultimate goals that the proposed legislation has
tried to attain so far have been misplaced. Policy makers should not
aim to triumph over the hurdle of defining or valuing privacy (which
may ultimately prove impossible), but should attempt the more
modest objective of allowing a level of consumer confidence and trust
whereby the Internet can be used at its most efficient level. The
remainder of this paper will detail a solution employing some of the
same technologies that are currently being employed to collect data;
this technology can instead be used as a mechanism for individual
consumers and profilers to work together to create an exchange for
personal information. Specifically, the technology can be used to
133. E.g., Internet Spyware (I-SPY) Prevention Act of 2005, H.R. 744, 109th Cong.
(2005) (attempting to make accessing protected computers using spyware a criminal
offense); Software Principles Yielding Better Levels of Consumer Knowledge Act, S. 687,
109th Cong. (2005) (making it unlawful to install spyware on a computer used in interstate
commerce without the users knowledge); Information Protection and Security Act, H.R.
1080, 109th Cong. (2005) (directing the FTC to promulgate regulations over data
collectors and authorizing states to bring civil claims to enforce FTC regulations);
Information Protection and Security Act, S. 500, 109th Cong. (2005) (same); Privacy Act
of 2005, S. 116, 109th Cong. (2005) (Prohibiting sale or disclosure of PII unless notice has
been given and users are given an opportunity to object).
134. See discussion supra Part II.B.2.
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foster negotiations between the parties that should help the market
achieve a more efficient allocation of privacy protection.
Ill. Technology as a Market Creator
In the case of online advertising, the most reasonable approach is
to overcome existing inefficiencies by allowing both users and
marketers to place a value on personal information for themselves.
Legislation can attempt to foster a negotiation where all involved can
come to a mutually beneficial decision. Therefore, the goal of any
legislation should not be to place a definition and value on privacy,
but to enable trust by allowing users and websites to set the optimal
terms for Internet use.
With this goal in mind, the best way to enhance trust is to allow
consumers to decide their own privacy's worth and then allow
websites to decide how much content to give up in exchange for each
user's choice of privacy protection. The government can help to
encourage an exchange of information between consumers and
websites. Through private interactions, the parties can determine the
importance each side places on the information. Although at first
glance it seems that the transaction costs from such an arrangement
would be tremendous, online software could be used to automate the
negotiation and decrease costs to a manageable level.
An automated system could facilitate a privacy-for-content
transaction between the user and the website. Users could offer
private information to websites. In exchange, the websites would
allow access to their content. As users allow more collection of
personal information, websites could increase the users' level of
access to the sites' subject matter. In this system, when a user is not
willing to allow the websites to gather much information, the website
can respond by only authorizing a cursory right to view content.
Conversely, when users are willing to volunteer more information
than sites would normally be able to collect under the current model,
the websites could grant full access or even special privileges to those
users. The sites could offer coupons or other incentives to encourage
users to furnish additional information. In effect, the transaction
taking place will be an information-for-information exchange; the
user offers personal information and in return the website would
allow access to the site's substance.
To simplify the process, the transaction can piggyback on the
communication that is already taking place between user computers
and the website servers. Presently, when a user visits a website, the
user's computer relays a request to the site for the content that
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webpage provides. In return, the site sends its content, and often,
takes information from the user in return."' Currently, this
communication and information divulgence occurs without the user's
consent or even knowledge. An automated negotiation would simply
correct the information asymmetry in the current model and
condition the website's release of content on the release of the user's
personal information.
For instance, a web user could program her browser to prevent
the release of all personally identifiable information. When the user
visits a website, say - a news site - that wishes to ascertain personally
identifiable information, the user's browser would stop the collection.
In response, the web server would inform the browser that if it cannot
proceed with its data collection the site will only provide access to
headlines and a few select full stories. This way the website and the
user can exchange data up until the point where the marginal cost for
one of the parties giving up more information equals the marginal
benefit of receiving any new information from the other.
The business running the website can decide how much content
it is willing to release in exchange for different levels of personal
information. If a website decides that it will not provide very much
content unless it is allowed to collect a high level of personal
information, it is likely many consumers will decide not to visit that
site. In the news-provider example, if the website restricts access to
headlines unless it is allowed to collect personally identifiable
information, users will simply turn to other, more "generous" sites.
As a result, traffic would decrease for the restrictive website as
consumers search for competitors that provide more favorable terms
of exchange.
Of course, over time websites will adjust their menus of options
in response to consumer demands. If the menu of privacy options is
well defined, websites could make calculated judgments as to their
expected loss in consumer traffic versus the gain in profiling
information. If the menu system allows users to decide among many
distinct privacy levels, the website can calculate the type of personal
135. Once a web address (in the form of either an Internet Protocol Address or
domain name) is typed into a browser, the browser contacts the computer at the address.
The browser alerts the server that the user is requesting the server's web page. The
browser also tells the server its own address. The server may then request more details
about the user's computer such as the browser type, the operating system and the screen
size. This information is used to ensure that the page is displayed in its optimal format.
The server then sends the web page to the browser to display to the user. For a detailed
description of how computers and web servers communicate on the web see Jeff Tyson,
How Stuff Works, at http://computer.howstuffworks.com/internet-infrastructure.htm.
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information it values most and what information is subordinate to
their purposes. The news site, therefore, must decide if the loss in
traffic is worth the benefit from the types of personal information
they are trying to collect. A loss in consumer traffic can be
devastating for a commercial website. Because many sites are
subsidized by advertising revenue, decreases in traffic means a decline
in sponsorship.
In a Cosean world without transaction costs, marketers and users
will bargain to the most efficient allocation of privacy.136 The
automated system I propose helps reduce transaction costs and allows
consumers to have better information. Thus, it brings us closer to a
Cosean equilibrium result.
13 7
A. Detailed Description of the Technology
With this framework in mind, an automated system can now be
explained with more specificity. The automated system can be
embedded into web browsers and can communicate with web servers
that are pre-programmed to complete the negotiation. When a
consumer first installs her web browser, the installation program
could prompt the user to input her privacy preferences. This could be
done in many ways; one way is through a series of multiple-choice
questions. Each question could be primed by a brief description of the
type of information with which the question is dealing and the ways
that information can be used once given up. The description could
also inform the user about the benefits she may be giving up by not
allowing the collection of data.'
136. ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS (4th ed. 2003)
discussing Ronald Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960). For
example, if a cattle rancher and a corn farmer own adjacent land, the two parties can
bargain to arrive at the most efficient distribution of the land depending on the value each
party receives from that property. The cattle rancher would be willing to give up a certain
portion of his land as long as he received a payment that is greater than the incremental
benefit he would receive from allowing his cattle to graze on that property. Likewise, the
corn farmer would be willing to pay for a portion of the cattle rancher's estate, providing
the payment was less than the incremental benefit the farmer could receive from growing
corn on that land. If the amount the corn farmer were willing to pay exceeded the amount
the cattle rancher would require, the cattle rancher would sell that part of his land. At the
same time, the corn farmer will continue to purchase more land from the cattle rancher
until the marginal benefit of purchasing the next piece of land is less than the price
necessary for the cattle rancher. Therefore, each portion of the property will be
distributed to the party who values that portion the most - a Pareto efficient equilibrium
will be achieved. Id.
137. Coase, supra note 136.
138. See 2000 FTC REPORT, supra note 35, at 8-10 (consumer benefits from online
data collection include allowing websites to remember usernames and passwords, creation
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Table 1: A proposal for menu setting for the automated system.
PRIVACY LEVEL /
INFORMATION TYPES OF INFORMATION AVAILABLE FOR
AVAILABLE FOR COLLECTION AND TO WHOM
COLLECTION
Highest privacy / no The user does not allow anyone to collect any
information available information. User consent is required before any
monitoring can be conducted for any reason.
Single-session cookies can be set by the website.
The cookies can help a user complete a
transaction, but the site cannot save any data
that is not related to the specific exchange. Data
cannot be used for advertising.
High Privacy The website can collect information, but third
Intermediate Levels party advertisers cannot. The site could use the
information for its own advertising, but cannot
sell the data.
Websites can collect information, but still cannot
sell it. Specific user consent is required any time
a third party wishes to collect data.
Medium privacy/ Allows cookies to be set on the computer and
medium information surfing habits to be monitored by the website
available and third parties. Profiles cannot be combined
with personally identifiable information. The
non-identifiable profiles can be sold.
All advertisers can collect information, but
Loeriay Lcannot combine profiles with information about
the user's offline activities.
of online shopping carts, personalization of home pages, making recommendations about
future purchases, targeted advertisements sent to interested consumers, and reduction of
repeated exposure to the same ads).
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Both the sites and third party advertisers can
collect information. Websites can combine
profiles with personally identifiable information,
but third parties cannot.
Any advertisers can set cookies, collect
information, and combine profiles with
personally identifiable information.
The user will make personal information such as
their name, address, phone number, email
address and product interests available. The user
would not be available for future contact.
Offers name, address, phone number, email
address and product interests. This setting will
also make consumers available to marketers who
wish to contact them for further information.
Lowest privacy/most The user would make personal information
information available available to marketers and would make himself
available for future contact. Further, the user
agrees to provide even more detailed
information, if requested.
The system would provide consumers a menu from which to
choose how much information they are willing to give up and for what
price (see Table 1). At one end of the gamut, users could elect to
prohibit any information from being tracked without express
approval. This prohibition would extend to information required for
the website to provide services; however, the exclusion would not
stop consumers from providing certain information manually. For
instance, if a website normally places a cookie on a user's computer
for the sole purpose of tailoring the appearance of their pages for the
user,139 that service would not be permitted. Therefore, the user would
not be able to customize a website, but would be able to protect any
disclosure of her personal information.
At the other end of the privacy-preference spectrum, users could
elect to actively sell all of their information. The setting would go
beyond just allowing websites to collect information; users who
139. For example, many web portals such as MyYahoo! allow users to choose the
information that will appear on the user's web page. The user can request that the site
provide local and business news, but not sports. The user can also choose the look of the
page, specifically the color scheme and layout. Since this level of customization requires
the web server to remember information about the user, such as their hometown, under
the maximum privacy protection these services would not be provided.
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choose this extreme will effectively be putting out an active
solicitation to profilers who may want to purchase their information.
In effect, this setting will create a venue through which users who
wish to sell their information can find buyers. Under the current
regime, consumers cannot operate in this manner. This setting is ideal
for people who place a very low value on their personal information,
but do prefer to receive very tailored advertisements.
Consumers who volunteer to sell their information do not mind
giving up personal information about themselves when they are
adequately compensated. People who choose to set their browsers to
this extreme would not merely allow marketers to track their
movement online, but would in fact be offering even more
information than the data collectors could mine on their own. These
consumers could enter the information that they wish to sell into their
browser to help further reverse transaction costs. This way, the
consumer will not have to manually supply his personal information
to each site that wants to collect the data; instead, the browser will
automatically supply the data when the web server makes the request.
Most likely, many marketers would be willing to pay for this
information in some form. Even in the current model, marketers pay
for personal information about users from websites, either by
purchasing entire user profiles or by paying for the ability to work
through a website to gather the information. Conceivably, as long as
the price is on par with the current model, these data collectors would
be willing to pay the users directly for the same information. It is even
possible that the marketers would be willing to pay even more than
they currently do. By paying the users directly, the marketers will
receive more information about the users than through mere
observation. Also, there will not be harsh consequences to the
company's reputation because the collection will be straightforward,
unlike under the current scheme. Furthermore, the information is
more likely to be accurate because the users can provide the data
directly and willingly. Marketers who would like to purchase accurate
and detailed information about consumers can either contact the
consumer with an offer or collect the information from the browser
for a predetermined price.
A sample transaction under this setting would work as follows. A
user could select a price ahead of time and enter that price into his
browser. Whenever a data collector is willing to pay that price, they
will get access to the information.4 ° The tender could be a cash
140. One serious issue that may arise from this system is the threat to the user's
[28:101
payment, discount coupons or any other sort of compensation.
Consumers will have an incentive to set a reasonable price for their
information if they wish to be compensated. Although many data
collectors may be prepared to pay for the information, they may not
be willing to pay exorbitantly high prices. Therefore, users who truly
wish to sell their information would try to set an affordable price.
This setting would also be beneficial for consumers who desire
specific targeted advertising. For example, if someone is currently in
the market for a car or other major consumer good they could enter
their buying preferences into the browser. The consumer could then
set a low price for marketers to purchase the information - possibly
offer it for free. As marketers collect the information from the
consumer, the marketers will learn about the purchase the consumer
wishes to make. The marketer could then target advertisements to the
user. These advertisements could help inform the user about different
products and prices in the relevant market. Because the ads will be
targeted to specific consumers, the seller could also offer special
discounted prices for specific products. This way, the advertiser
benefits by only having to advertise to interested consumers and the
user benefits from becoming more informed about desired products,
which, in turn, lowers search costs. This is a significant improvement
over the present system where marketers must extrapolate users'
personal security. It is possible nefarious characters will try to access this information
either by purchasing it or through hacking. Once the data is accessed, the information can
be used to carry out identity theft or other crimes. While this system may raise the risk of
this sort of criminal behavior, these risks already exist and are addressed in the criminal
law. See, e.g., The Identity Theft and Assumption Deterrence Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1028 (2003)
(making it a federal crime to "knowingly transfers or uses, without lawful authority, a
means of identification of another person with the intent to commit, or to aid or abet, any
unlawful activity that constitutes a violation of federal law, or that constitutes a felony
under any applicable state or local law."); ALASKA STAT. § 11.46.565 (2005) ("A person
commits the crime of criminal impersonation in the first degree if the person.., without
authorization of the other person, uses the access device or identification document of
another person to obtain a false identification document, open an account at a financial
institution, obtain an access device, or obtain property or service"); CAL. PENAL CODE §§
530.5-8 (2002) ("Every person who willfully obtains personal identifying information ... of
another person, and uses that information for any unlawful purpose" is guilty of identity
theft); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 817.568 (2003) ("Any person who willfully and without
authorization fraudulently uses, or possesses with intent to fraudulently use, personal
identification information concerning an individual without first obtaining that individual's
consent, commits the offense of fraudulent use of personal identification information,
which is a felony of the third degree"); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2C:21-17 (2003) (illegal identity
theft is when someone "impersonates another or assumes a false identity and does an act
in such assumed character or false identity for purpose of obtaining a benefit for himself
or another or to injure or defraud another").
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interests and users have no way to indicate their preferences to the
market.
One question that may arise is: how will the specific marketers
find out about consumers who are willing to sell their information? If
a consumer who is in the market for a house is visiting an online
news-provider, how will the housing advertiser know to purchase the
information, and the news-provider know that it should not? First, the
problem with the news-provider can be solved by the pricing scheme
the consumer uses. If the consumer truly wants advertisements about
houses, that user can set their browser to release that information for
free. That way the news-provider's server can look at the user's
preferences quickly and decide whether it wants to send specific ads.
Conversely, to solve the problem of alerting the appropriate
housing marketers, the system could take advantage of the network
that advertisers, such as DoubleClick, have already put in place.
These network advertisers already contract with thousands of
websites to collect information. When a user visits a site in the
network, the advertiser could collect the consumer's information and
alert their clients in the housing market.
Between the two extremes of the privacy preference spectrum
described above fall many intermediary points. These different levels
of privacy could provide different benefits and protections for
consumers. The user could choose to allow collection of personal
information, but not personally identifiable information. For
example, if a user decides she does not mind being watched or
receiving targeted advertising, but does not feel comfortable having
their profile tied to them personally, that level of protection can be
afforded.
Another point on the spectrum could allow the collection of
certain types of information, but not others. For instance, the user
could allow the assembly of a profile containing information about
the type of sites the user visits, but not information about in which
city the person lives. This option could satisfy users who do not mind
data being gathered about their online habits, but would prefer to
keep information about their lives offline secure.
The browser could also be set to prevent users from even
manually turning over information to the website. Parents may
choose this option as a security measure to prevent their children
from unwittingly giving up information. Some parents may also like
the idea of preventing their children from making purchases on the
Internet, which require some information to be given over to the
website. Manual data entry is one way marketers combine their
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profiles with personally identifiable information under the current
regime.' 1  This setting could help parents protect children's
information and also assist anyone who wants to make sure they do
not mistakenly turn over information themselves.
This setting could also address certain consumer fears by
allowing consumers to request that websites only use the information
they collect for the specific purpose for which the information is
entered. For example, the user's address may be turned over to a site
that sells and delivers books to help facilitate a delivery. The user's
pre-programmed browser would then instruct the web server that the
information could only be used for that single purpose - the delivery
of the book.
Although this discussion has focused on the user's side of the
bargain thus far, the websites would also have to make certain
adjustments to comply with this system. Websites would need to
tailor their systems based on how much content they are willing to
offer in exchange for the personal information the user will provide.
The site could also decide to charge a subscription fee if it is not given
access to enough information. Because many sites are subsidized by
advertising revenue, if they are not able to collect sufficient
information, they will not be able to operate their site effectively.
Therefore, charging a subscription as an alternative to giving up the
collections of personal information may be an attractive solution for
some sites.
While many privacy advocates demand better security for
information, most do not offer alternative revenue sources for the
websites.' 2 Under the proposed automated system, the sites could
choose how much content to provide and whether they need to
charge a supplement to their advertising income. As discussed above,
this decision can be computed by calculating the point at which the
marginal utility of collecting personal information falls below the
marginal cost of providing more content or charging a subscription. 43
One issue that may arise is how smaller websites or personal sites
will implement the system. While it may be relatively easy for larger
141. See Federal Trade Commission, Online Profiling: A Report to Congress (Jun.
2000). A marketer could tag a user's computer with a cookie and observe the user's
behavior online. Then, when the user makes a purchase and has to enter his name and
address, the information can be added to the profile. From then on, whenever the
marketers track the computer with that cookie, it will also have the personally identifiable
information handy.
142. See discussion supra Part II. C.
143. Id.
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websites to customize, smaller sites may not have the wherewithal to
install such a system. For these sites, they may choose to put in a one-
size-fits-all setting for their system. Personal websites can simply set
their page to allow complete access to anyone, regardless of the users'
privacy preferences. Smaller commercial websites could set a firm
floor: users who have restrictive privacy preferences below the floor
will not receive any access and users above the floor get total access.
This way, smaller sites do not have to go through the expense of
developing a complex access scheme that depends on user
preferences.
Of course, this regime may cause some sites to fail. Most likely,
there will be a few sites that cannot afford to give up the total access
to personal information that they currently enjoy. With regards to
privacy, however, these sites represent a loss to overall economic
efficiency. As mentioned above, the current state of privacy
protection is not optimal."* If websites fail because they cannot afford
to restrict their access to personal information, the sites are not
operating efficiently within the market. When the automated system
is put in place, the resulting privacy allocation will be much closer to
the most efficient level. If a website cannot exist at this equilibrium
point, then the site was most likely collecting more information than
an efficient market would have allowed, anyway. The loss of these
sites will help correct the current market failures. The result is a
traditional Laissez Faire solution; either the site will adjust to the
market or it will fail.
The cost of implementing the system will not be exorbitant to
most users or sites, however. An advantage of this system from an
operational perspective is that it can be easily developed from
existing technology. Most web browsers already allow users a certain
level of input about the level of privacy they desire online.'45 This pre-
existing system can be modified to give the user more options and to
communicate these choices with the websites servers.
144. Id.
145. For instance, in Microsoft's web browser - Explorer - users can choose among
several levels of protection from cookies. At one end, cookies will be blocked entirely;
conversely, users can also choose to allow complete surveillance. Other browsers use
different variations of this system. The system does not block technology such as web
bugs, however. Also, the system is completely a defensive measure. Users can try to block
websites' encroachments on privacy, but the system does not deal with the marketers to
assure they will not try to circumvent the privacy protections. This type of system may
encourage an arms race between users and websites, with each trying to develop better
technology to combat the other. This arms race is an economic waste.
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On the website side, servers are designed to collect information
from users. Currently, the server can choose to format the page in
specific ways to account for the user's computer capabilities and
software. Many websites also can determine whether certain content
should be made available to specific users. For example, some sites
require a subscription, and the site must determine whether the user
attempting to access the site has paid for that right.'46 Also, many
businesses, such as banks, keep a separate account for each client.147
These sites require a username and password to access individualized
accounts. Because websites are already capable of customizing and
tailoring content for each user who visits the site, it is conceivable that
the sites could also customize their content to each visitor based on
the user's privacy preferences.
Another possibility would be to allow the system to be loosely
based on the technology from a current privacy program called the
Platform for Privacy Preferences Project ("P3P"). This platform is
already in place on many current browsers and websites. 48 P3P is a
developing industry standard for privacy practice designed to create a
benchmark for privacy that can be easily interpreted by users'
computers.49 The program attempts to simplify and automate website
privacy policies." ° Essentially, P3P is designed to allow users to enter
their privacy preferences into their browser (similar to this proposed
solution) and at the same time websites can convert their privacy
policies into a machine-readable language. When the browser visits a
website, it can read the site's policy. If the terms of the policy do not
match the user's preferences, the browser will alert the user. The
users can then decide whether or not they want to remain at the
website or move on to a more privacy-friendly site.
An automated system could conceivably be built on top of the
existing P3P platform. Because the technology already exists and has
been extensively employed in some form, implementation would not
be overwhelmingly expensive. Although P3P represents an important
first step, it is important to realize that it is only a beginning. P3P
146. See, e.g., www.lexisnexis.com.
147. See, e.g., www.ameritrade.com.
148. Approximately 25% of the top 100 websites had adopted the program by the
beginning of November 2002. http://www.w3.org/2002/12/18-p3p-workshop-report.html.
Both Netscape and Internet Explorer have some form of the P3P system already in place.
http://www.w3.org/P3P/implementations.
149. See Platform for Privacy Preferences, http://www.w3.org/P3P/#what (last visited
September 3, 2005).
150. Id.
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simply alerts users when some parts of their privacy preferences do
not match a website's privacy policy. To be fully effective, however,
the system must have many more levels of control for both the users
and websites. Additionally, the system must foster an exchange
between the parties. P3P is grounded on a model of "notice and
choice.""'' The automated system proposed here goes well beyond
this simple model. The automated transaction is not based on the
concept of simply alerting a user, but allowing the user to interact
with a website. The system will allow the two parties to come to
mutual - and enforceable - decisions about the value of private
information and the related value of the website's content.
B. The Role of the Government
The market's experience with P3P can also provide guidance
with regard to the second part of this proposed solution. Although the
P3P technology is relatively widespread, it has not taken hold with
consumers or smaller websites.'52 By making the system mandatory
and creating a cause of action for violating the agreement, the
government can ensure more pervasive adoption of an automated
program and therefore even more trust in the system.
1. Mandatory Adoption
In the case of P3P, although the system was originally adopted
relatively quickly among top websites, that growth slowed with the
economic downturn following the burst of the dotcom bubble.
Several difficulties have plagued the program since its inception,
which has contributed to the lack of interest from both consumers
and websites. One fundamental problem has been a pervasive
misunderstanding of the concept behind the program. Although the
idea of P3P has been promoted as a cure-all for Internet privacy,"' it
is actually only an attempt to create an industry standard for privacy
policies.' "P3P needs a regulatory or policy context to help protect
151. Id.
152. Paul Festa, Promise of P3P Stalls as Backers Regroup, CNet, Oct. 29, 2002,
http://news.com.com2lOO-1023-963632.html.
153. Id.
154. See, e.g., Lawrence Lessig, The Architecture of Privacy, 1 VAND. J. ENT. L. &
PRAC. 56, 63-65 (1999) (suggesting that P3P could create a change in the architecture of
the Internet and allow machines to be the agents to protect privacy).
155. Platform for Privacy Preferences website, http://www.w3.org/P3P/#what (P3P "is
emerging as an industry standard providing a simple, automated way for users to gain
more control over the use of personal information on Web sites they visit") (last visited
September 3, 2005).
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privacy, it cannot do this by itself."156 This misunderstanding has led
many privacy advocates to condemn the system for not providing
enough protection, even though protection has never been the stated
purpose of the program. The condemnation has lead to deflated user
interest.
Another obstacle has been economic. The protocol was
conceived during an economic boom in the technology sector.
Unfortunately, the market lost steam before the standard could be
widely accepted. Because P3P is only a proposed industry standard, it
is not mandatory. Supporters of the system believed websites would
adopt the program as a result of user demand. The belief was that
because users place such high value on their privacy they will
generally be attracted to sites that use the protocol; as user preference
for the system becomes apparent, websites will adopt the system to
attract more traffic. Regrettably, this adoption pattern never
developed, creating a cycle of disinterest. As smaller websites'
economic resources diminished, their interest in providing privacy
waned due to the cost of setting up the system and the loss of
profiling-related revenue.' Once website adoption floundered, many
web users (those who are aware of the system) gave up the hope that
even setting up the system in their browsers was worth the effort.
According to some online privacy progress reports, "[i]f few sites
support P3P, consumers will have little incentive to use the
technology, thus creating a sort of chicken and egg problem."'58
The cycle of disinterest intensified because the system is entirely
voluntary, and the sites with the most to lose chose not to comply.
These sites generally collect the most information and have privacy
policies consumers would most like to avoid. For these sites, adoption
of the standard would hinder their ability to collect information and
hurt their profitability. Some critics believe the protocol can never
reach the critical mass necessary to become a true standard because
adoption is not in the best interest of many websites."9
156. Center for Democracy and Technology, P3P AND PRIVACY: AN UPDATE FOR
THE PRIVACY COMMUNITY (2000), http://www.cdt.org/privacy/pet/p3pprivacy.shtml.
157. Id.
158. Electronic Privacy Information Center, PRETTY POOR PRIVACY: AN
ASSESSMENT OF P3P AND INTERNET PRIVACY (2000) (discussing the problems the
creators of P3P had getting their system adopted as an industry standard),
http://www.epic.org/reports/prettypoorprivacy.html.
159. Jason Catlett, Open Letter 9/13 to P3P Developers (Sept. 13, 1999) (arguing that
P3P will hinder, rather than increase, privacy protections online), at
http://www.junkbusters.com/standards.html (last visited Sept. 4, 2005).
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Even if these sites do accept the standard, it does not come with
any enforcement mechanism. 6" The protocol, therefore, does not
breed the trust required to make the Internet perform optimally,
further decreasing the probability of consumer adoption. In the
current environment of unclear privacy laws, especially in the case of
financial and medical websites, no one is sure how enforcement
would even operate practically. 6'
A quick look at the causes of P3P's failure to take hold can lead
to some clear solutions. The first issue to be addressed is the critical
mass problem: websites will not adopt the standard without consumer
demand, but consumers have not demanded the protocol without
widespread website adoption. The question, then, is how acceptance
of the system can achieve the critical mass where both consumers and
websites view it as in their best interest to comply with the system.
There may be a simple fix to this problem - make the system
mandatory. Without making compliance compulsory, websites will
face a classic Prisoner's Dilemma game:62 although the adoption of
the privacy system can benefit all websites, 163 each site will be better
off individually by not adopting the system.16' The most efficient result
for the web community as a whole comes when all websites adopt a
certain level of privacy protection. Protection benefits consumers by
increasing the feeling of security; likewise, privacy can help online
businesses because increased privacy can lead to improved electronic
commerce.161 If a site acts alone, however, it will lose the ability to
160. Electronic Privacy Information Center, supra note 158 ("Even where there is
agreement about the privacy terms for a particular transaction, P3P provides no means to
ensure enforcement of the stated privacy policies and the P3P developers do not seem
particularly concerned about this problem").
161. Id.
162. COOTER & ULEN, supra note 136, at 93 n.3.
163. See 1998 FTC REPORT, supra note 4, at 3-4 (discussing how privacy can be
beneficial for all websites).
164. Steven A. Hetcher, The Emergence Of Website Privacy Norms, 7 MICH.
TELECOMM. TECH. L. REV. 97, 116-17 (2000/2001) (describing that although it may be to
the industry's overall benefit to have increased privacy protection for consumers, each
individual site has an incentive to lower its own particular privacy standards).
165. See, e.g., Turow, supra note 11, at 22. Fifty-seven percent of respondents to a
survey said it would bother them if stores that they shopped at collected detailed
information. Further, the survey also found that only 49% of respondents said that if they
trusted an online store that they would not mind giving the store information about
products purchased during the last month. See also 2000 FTC REPORT, supra note 35, at
10-17 which describes many consumer concerns about profiling and notes that ultimately
consumer concerns become business concerns. Another FTC Report notes that 87% of
respondents to a survey were concerned about giving information to business online, and
that it was not surprising that only a quarter of users who look for information online
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collect detailed information about its consumers while its competitors
maintain their advantage. The loss of this information will, in turn,
decrease advertising revenue for the one site that complies. Sites that
respect privacy will, therefore, have a difficult time competing
financially with competitors that do collect information and maintain
their marketing income. Hence, without across the board adoption,
no individual site will have an incentive to decrease their data
collecting behavior. The websites will, in fact, have motivation to
avoid privacy protection, even if the rest of the community develops a
strong privacy norm. If the site were to collect personal information
while its competitors do not, the assembled profiles will be a scarcer
commodity, and thus worth more to the advertising market.
166
The failure of self-regulation comes from the government's
common assumption that the web community acts as a cohesive
whole. 167
This is the fallacy of thinking that because a group,
considered as a whole, would benefit from some
particular political outcome, that therefore it is in the
interest of each of the particular members of that
group to do its part to help bring about this political
outcome. It is simply false to assume that a typical
website would have such an interest.68
It is, therefore, necessary to compel action from the parties or
else the individual self-interest of the websites will lead to a sub-
optimal result.161 While the industry has thus far shown an aversion to
government regulation, opposition to the automated system should
not be as firm because it does not force websites to adopt a strong
privacy norm. The system will lead to increased consumer trust, but
websites will not have to give up all of their profitable data collection
behavior.
actually make online purchases. FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, THE FTC's FIRST FIVE
YEARS: PROTECTING CONSUMERS ONLINE (1999), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/1999/12/fiveyearreport.pdf.
166. Hetcher, supra note 164, at 119 ("Each website would like all the other sites to be
respectful so that it alone can take advantage of the more trusting consumers").
167. Id. at 117 (noting that the FTC has failed to create a successful privacy program
because the programs are based on the assumption that websites act together rather than
in their own individual self interests).
168. Id. at 117-8.
169. Id. at 119-123 (explaining why self-regulation cannot work, and that the
government must take a more active role to protect consumer privacy).
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2. Create a Cause of Action
The most important legislative aspect of an information-for-
privacy solution is to allow users to bring suits against websites that
fail to comply with the conditions to which their automated programs
agree. By creating a private cause of action, consumer trust will be
enhanced and websites will have an incentive to make sure consumers
are aware of the agreement. While websites can currently suffer many
harsh consequences including user-initiated lawsuits if the site does
not comply with its posted privacy policy, the policies themselves do
not have to be very respectful of users' privacy.7 ° Nor is it required
that the site make it easy for a consumer to understand the policy.
The transaction costs are usually high enough for consumers that they
never read the policies, and therefore websites do not have an
incentive to post secure guidelines. Consumer transaction costs arise
for several reasons. The policies may be hard to locate on the site.
Once found, the policy can be extremely long and in complex,
legalistic language. The transaction costs are usually high enough that
most users would rather risk their privacy than spend the time to find
out about each site's policy.
Because most users do not read the policies, websites are not
very worried when they have to disclose unfair terms. If the users
were to read the policies on many of the sites that they visit, they may
be surprised to learn that their favorite sites generally collect and sell
consumers' personal information unabated. 7' The policies would also
inform the users that third parties can collect information through the
website, and these third parties are not even bound by the stated
170. For example, the Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 41-58 (2004)
allows the FTC to bring suits against companies that do not comply with their own privacy
policies, but it does not control the substance of the policies. See, e.g., Petco Animal
Supplies, Inc., No. C-4133, 2005 FTC LEXIS 39, at 2-4 (Mar. 4, 2005)(bringing a claim
against Petco for failing to adequately protect personal information collected from the
website, even though their privacy policy states "At PETCO.com, protecting your
information is our number one priority, and your personal data is strictly shielded from
unauthorized access.").
171. See, e.g., Turow, supra note 11 ("75% [of survey respondents] do not know the
correct response-false-to the statement, 'When a website has a privacy policy, it means
the site will not share my information with other websites and companies."'). See also the
"privacy guidelines" from cnn.com that states that both personally identifiable and non-
personally identifiable information may be collected. Available at
http://www.cnn.com/privacy.html. The guidelines go on to state that "Certain Time
Warner sites may disclose personally identifiable information to companies whose
practices are not covered by this privacy notice.., that want to market products or
services to you." Id.
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policy.' Additionally, many users may be disturbed to find out that
the websites reserve the right to change the policy at any time without
notice.'73 This means that to stay informed about a sites privacy
practices, not only does the user have to read the posted privacy
policy, the policy must be reviewed prior to each visit to the site to
make sure it has not changed since the last review. Given that most
current privacy policies offer so little restriction on the sites'
behavior, the threat of suit for a violation does not really have any
teeth. It would be extremely difficult for a website to actually violate
their policy. Under the automated system, however, the conditions to
which sites agree could provide significantly more protections than
are currently offered. Under this system, the consequences from a
lawsuit would be much more dire for a website and provide more
security for users.
One issue that would exist for users under the automated system,
however, would be the cost to monitor and enforce the agreement. 74
Discovering a violation could be difficult for users. It may also be
prohibitively expensive to litigate the matter; most litigation will cost
significantly more than any damage from a violation. As a result,
websites may not feel obligated to respect the terms of their
arrangement because they will not have a real fear of any penalty.
The solution for both the monitoring and enforcement costs
could be class action suits and consumer activist groups. While
litigation expenses may be too high for most individual users,
collectively it will be cost effective for consumers to bring an action
against non-compliant sites. Presumably, if a website were to break its
agreement with a single user, it would also break the terms of the
contract with other users. It would be costly and pointless for a
website to seek out a single user to cause a violation. The value of
profiling comes from the information in the aggregate; it is not cost-
effective to single out users for observation. A violation of the terms
of the automated agreement will probably result from a website
adjusting its server to ignore the terms of all of the agreements.
Therefore, violations will be much more widespread across visitors to
172. See, e.g., http://www.cnn.com/privacy.html.
173. Id. ("From time to time, we may update this privacy notice. We will notify you
about material changes in the way we treat personally identifiable information by placing
a notice on our site. We encourage you to periodically check back and review this policy
so that you always will know what information we collect, how we use it, and to whom we
disclose it.")
174. COOTER & ULEN, supra note 136, at 101. Two primary sources of transaction
costs are monitoring and enforcement. A third cost is communication. Ideally, the
automated system will reduce communication costs to zero.
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that site. All the users against whom the website breaches could bring
a class action suit against the site to help defray the costs of litigation.
Additionally, if monetary awards were possible, lawyers may seek out
litigation themselves and find victims to represent. This will help
decrease monitoring costs for the users.
The only adjustment the government would need to make to
normal contract law would be to allow a single suit for the violation of
many different contracts. Defendant websites may argue that each
time a user's browser negotiates a deal with a website server a new
contract is created. A website that is targeted by litigation could claim
that a violation is a breach of each contract separately and therefore
requires separate litigation. Any legislation should allow collective
actions in such cases and the damages could be split according to the
harm done to each consumer.
Aside from class actions, another solution could be consumer
privacy advocate groups that bring suits against websites on behalf of
all consumers. Already some consumer groups bring significant
resources to their battles for more online privacy."' Advocate groups
have brought complaints to the FTC, to congressional legislative
meetings and some privacy related lawsuits.176 It is very likely these
groups would continue their vigilance to promote enforcement of the
automated agreements.
IV. Benefits From The Automated System
By mandating a technological solution to the problem of online
privacy the government can bring several benefits to both consumers
and websites. Part A of this section will focus on benefits to both
consumers and websites. Specifically, part A will address the ways an
automated negotiation can help both sides internalize the other's
positions and reduce the economic externality websites are currently
imposing on users. The discussion will also focus on how an
automated system can help increase consumer trust. Once
established, the increased trust can serve benefits on both websites
and consumers. Part B will discuss benefits that can be enjoyed by
175. For example, Electronic Privacy Information Center ("EPIC") is a public interest
research center that focuses on privacy issues. According to their 2003-2004 Annual
Report, EPIC raised between one million and one and a half million dollars each year
from 2001 to 2003. EPIC ANNUAL REPORT (2003-2004),
http://www.epic.org/epic/annual-reports/2003.pdf.
176. Id. at 11 (listing several cases that EPIC brought or to which they contributed
including complaints against the Department of Defense, Department of Justice and
others).
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websites specifically. Websites can benefit from more certainty about
future legislation and litigation. Part C will turn to how the system
can allow the government to avoid the impossible task of defining and
valuing privacy. Finally, the last part of this section will address some
issues that may linger in any system that allows privacy to be
commodified.
A. Benefits for Both Consumers and Websites
The automated system can help each party internalize the
motivations of the other by eliminating the all-or-nothing option that
currently exists. Profilers create a negative externality when they
collect information; while they pay the cost for the actual collection of
the data they do not pay the costs their intrusion tolls on Internet
users' lives. 77 In the current system, many consumers are also
ignoring the benefits marketers can provide. Consumers who choose
to avoid the Internet or decrease their use of the web are disregarding
the possible benefits from targeted advertising. Both parties to this
transaction are discounting the implications of their actions on the
other.
An information-for-privacy exchange could allow both sides of
the transaction to take the other's interests into account. Profilers
would be more sensitive to user interests when the parties negotiate.
Part of the internalization, of course, will be obligatory. When the
websites are forced to negotiate and agree to some user demands for
increased security, they will have no choice but to respect privacy
concerns. Not all of the internalization will be required, however.
Marketers currently spend significant resources to develop
advertisements that can attract progressively more disinterested
users' attention. If users agree to allow targeted advertising, they are
much more likely to devote some attention to the advertisements.
The advertisements that consumers do receive will be much more
tailored to them personally and consumers will be more likely to
solicit the businesses that market to the consumer's particular needs.
Presently, barrages of advertisements assail users each time they
log on to the network. Advertisers now use various blinking lights,
moving pictures and the notorious pop-up ads to attract users to their
business. Most users have learned to simply tune out all the
advertisements and focus completely on the content of the page.
17 8
177. See discussion supra Part II.B.
178. However, a recent survey found that over 93% of consumers find pop-up
advertisements "extremely annoying", Hostway, CONSUMERS' PET PEEVES ABOUT
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Worse for the content providers, consumers may avoid some pages
completely if the attempts at their attention become too much of an
annoyance. Online advertising has become such an aggravation that
many software programs are now available that block advertisements
and help thwart attempts to gather information."9 In response,
marketers are constantly developing ways to work around these
obstructions." If the consumer could negotiate with a website to
allow the collection of specific personal information, the
advertisements are likely to be more tailored to the users disclosed
preferences. As a result, marketers will not have to use so many
resources in attempts to attract users' attention.
Likewise, consumers can also support the marketers' values by
increasing the accuracy and volume of information marketers can
collect. When consumers explicitly allow collection of their personal
information they are more likely to be forthright about their
preferences. Under the current model, web users who are concerned
about the many ways in which information can be surreptitiously
collected elect to take countermeasures to avoid this profiling."' For
instance, users may give fictitious names or email addresses when
registering for various websites1 The misinformation can lower the
effectiveness of marketer's advertising by introducing inaccuracies
into their user profiles. Even if users did not actively try to confuse
their observers, simple observations still have their limit. If a
consumer buys a book online, the profiler would not know
immediately if that book represents an interest of that person, a one-
time gift or even a mistaken purchase. A profiler could finally make
that determination by collecting even more information and plugging
the data into algorithms that look for patterns in the user's habits.
A profiler's advertising decisions would be much more effective
if it received users' cooperation. Once a user has agreed to certain
types of data collection, she could help supply some of that data.
Consumers would be much more willing to assist in the process if they
are aware of the type of information being collected and the
COMMERCIAL WEB SITES, http://www.hostway.com/media/survey/petpeeves.html.
179. By 2004, all major web browsers included programs that allowed users to block
pop-up advertisements. Wikipedia, Pop-UP AD, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pop-up-ad.
180. Id. Many different spyware programs and advertising supported software will
cause advertisements to pop-up outside of the web browser. Also, some forms of instant
messaging will allow pop-up advertisements to come up on a user's computer.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pop-up-ad.
181. See Litman supra note 20, at 1285-6 (listing measures users take to avoid
profilers).
182. Id.
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restrictions on the use of that data. Further, as users become more
aware of the benefits of targeted advertising, they may even
encourage the practice in certain situations. Overall, profiles would
be much more accurate when users are given a chance to interact with
a profiler without fear.
Another benefit of an automated negotiation is the elimination
of user distrust found in the current market. As noted above,
economists have observed that economies with higher levels of trust
operate more efficiently. 83 The automated system will help enhance
trust in the electronic market: consumers will know exactly what
information is being collected and how it will be used and be able to
put limits on that use. Also, because users will be able to enforce their
agreements through the courts, the public does not need to fear
widespread violations of the agreements. A majority of Internet users
claim they restrict the amount of business they conduct online due to
concerns for their privacy. Hence, an increase in trust should help
increase electronic commerce overall. This increase in online business
will benefit all websites as they receive more traffic and more
consumers are willing to do business. The increased use of the web
will also help take advantage of the efficiencies the web provides for
the economy as a whole.
B. Website Specific Benefits
Organizations will be able to increase the amount they invest in
their online business because legislation instituting the automated
system will reduce legal uncertainty. For the past several years, each
Congressional session has been greeted with several hundred Internet
privacy related bill proposals."' Although none of these bills have
passed yet, uncertainty about future legislation has certainly
hampered online marketing. It is a risky venture to invest too heavily
in Internet advertising when the legal landscape is so unclear.
Additionally, since the advent of the web there has been
continual litigation concerning privacy online."" These suits have been
183. See discussion supra Part II.B.3.
184. See, e.g., Turow, supra note 11.
185. See, e.g., Internet Privacy Bills, supra note 121.
186. See, e.g., In re Pharmatrak Privacy Litig. 329 F.3d 9 (1st Cir. 2003) (finding that
users did not consent to having personal information collected by a company that tracked
internet traffic); In re Doubleclick Privacy Litig., 154 F. Supp. 2d 497 (S.D.N.Y. 2001)
(granting defendant's motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim when web users claimed
their personal information had been stolen); In re Toys R Us, Inc., Privacy Litig., MDL
No. M-00-1381 MMC, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16947 (N.D. Cal 2001) (denying defendants'
motion to dismiss claims regarding their surreptitious data mining).
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brought against websites, ISPs and marketers. 187 Although most cases
have been found in favor of the websites, the risk of future lawsuits
still exist. The risk is amplified because there have not been coherent
common law rules in effect to help guide future behavior.
Any type of privacy legislation has the potential to help cure this
uncertainty, however. Once a standard set of rules is put in place,
businesses will be able to predict their future legal positions more
accurately. This clarity will help encourage future investment in
online businesses.
The automated transaction has a benefit over many other
proposed solutions because it is more politically feasible. Most online
privacy proposals that attempt to limit information gathering have
met with opposition from industry groups. Many of the proposals also
face heavy criticism from privacy advocates asking for even more
protection.1 8 The advocates feel that once legislation is put in place,
the government will essentially be implicitly condoning all behaviors
that are not expressly restricted by the law. The rapid development of
the technology on the Internet further increases privacy advocates
concerns because most proposed legislation will only address the
current methods of data collection. As a consequence of the heavy
lobbying from both sides of the debate, the government has been at a
virtual standstill on the issue and the FTC has only been able to
recommended self-regulation among marketers.1 89
The automated system is not likely to meet the same level of
opposition, however. The proposal does not attempt to impose
blanket restrictions on harvesting or profiling behavior. Although
marketers will be restricted in some of their activities, they are not as
likely to oppose an automated system as adamantly because it will
allow many of the same types of profiling to exist. In fact, many
marketers may welcome the proposal because it gives users an
187. See cited cases, supra note 186.
188. See, e.g., FCC's Privacy Petition, Red Herring, Aug. 30, 2005,
http://www.redherring.com/Article.aspx?a=13382&hed=FCC%2%80%99s+Privacy+Petiti
on. ("The Electronic Privacy Information Center (EPIC),... filed a petition with the FCC
demanding more stringent requirements for telecommunications companies releasing
personal information about their customers."); Letter from EPIC to Florida Committee
on Privacy and Court Records (Nov. 1, 2004) (recommending Florida increase security for
personal information by regulating commercial data brokers) available at
http://www.epic.org/privacy/publicrecords/flcomments.pdf; Letter from Ari Schwartz,
Associate Director, Center for Democracy and Technology, to Data Privacy and Integrity
Committee, Department of Homeland Security (July 18, 2005) available at
http://www.cdt.org/testimony/20050718schwartz.pdf.
189. 2000 FTC REPORT, supra note 35.
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opportunity to supply more information. Additionally, even
marketers have acknowledged that improved security will help
augment web traffic.19° Because the system will encourage more
people to business online, many marketers should support the system.
The information-for-privacy exchange may also address many of
the concerns from privacy supporters. The system will not expressly
allow or forbid any type of behavior. Therefore, the government will
not be implicitly supporting any particular conduct. Additionally,
because the system is flexible it can also be adaptive. If new data
collecting technology emerges or new techniques become popular,
the parties can simply readjust their browsers' settings. For the most
part, the automated system is much more politically feasible than any
hard rule governing privacy.
C. Advantages for the Government
Finally, an automated system will allow legislators to overcome
the difficult task of protecting personal information without ever
being forced to find a clear definition of privacy. Paradoxically,
uncertainty has escalated recently in the very areas in which the
government has already attempted privacy legislation - financial and
medical information. Many critics believe The Gramm-Leach-Bliley
Act ("GLB"),19 which addresses financial privacy, and the Health
Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 ("HIPAA"), 191
which addresses medical privacy, have created more uncertainty than
they have eliminated.'9 Both laws attempt to create a federal "privacy
floor" for the use of sensitive information.' 94 However, it is difficult to
190. 1998 FIC REPORT, supra note 4.
191. Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, Pub. L. No. 106-102, 501, 113 Stat. 1338, 1436-37
(1999) (requiring financial institutions to secure personal information).
192. Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act, Pub. L 104-191, 264, 110
Stat. 1936 (1996) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §1320d-2) (requiring medical
institutions to secure certain personal medical information).
193. See, e.g., Jeffery B. Ritter, Benjamin S. Hayes & Henry L. Juoy, Emerging Trends
in International Privacy Law, 15 EMORY INT'L L. REV. 87, 97-104 (2001) (discussing how
American privacy legislation conflicts with other countries' laws); Edward E. Furash, The
GLB Conundrum, 83 RMA J. 88 (2001) (noting that under GLB banks face
"inappropriate expectations, confusion over who does what, and unclear costs"); Press
Release, LifePoint Hospitals, Inc., LifePoint Hospitals Reports First Quarter Results and
Announces Share Repurchase Program (Apr. 28, 2003) (listing uncertainty with HIPAA
compliance as a risk factor for the companies financial statements.) available at
http://www.lifepointhospitals2.com/.
194. Christopher C. Gallagher, Health Information Privacy: The Federal Floor's State
Elevator, 2 Privacy & Info. L. Report 1 (2000), available at
http://www.gcglaw.com/resources/healthcare/healthprivacy.pdf.
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determine where the floor sits and what behaviors operate above the
basic protections) 9'
The GLB purports to increase privacy protection by requiring
that financial institutions: (i) notify customers about their information
practices, (ii) give the consumers an opportunity to opt-out of the
practices and '(iii) create methods for protecting the collected
information.96 Despite the enactment of the GLB, however, the
possibility of additional federal legislation and proposed state
financial laws has continued to make the legal terrain uncertain for
financial institutions.' 97 Both the federal and state governments
continue to consider stricter guidelines for the use of financial
information because it has not been clear what actions industry will
need to take to comply with the new laws. 198 The federal government
has also been investigating ways to ensure that the GLB will be
compatible with the EU Directive."9 To further complicate matters,
the Act does not preempt state action, so industries must be wary of
possible state laws on the topic. °
Methods of compliance with HIPAA have also created
uncertainty for businesses operating within the medical industry.2°'
Like the GLB, HIPAA is meant to help set a federal "privacy floor,"
over which financial and medical organizations must act.
Unfortunately, the attempt to quantify privacy with that floor has led
to difficult and often contradictory regulations. °2 Some of the
difficulty originates from the establishment of the floor itself.
23
195. Id. ("the promised stability of the proliferating 'federal floor' doctrine is
becoming a policy nightmare more likely to result in consumer confusion than consumer
protection.").
196. Richard Lauter, Privacy Concerns and Safeguards in the Governmental
Dissemination of Bankruptcy Data on the Internet, 19-4 ABIJ 10 (2000) ("The new
regulations would (1) limit the non-consensual use and release of private health
information; (2) inform consumers about their right to access their records and to know
who else has accessed them; (3) restrict the disclosure of protected health information to
the minimum necessary; (4) establish new disclosure requirements for researchers and
others seeking access to health records; and (5) establish new criminal and civil sanctions
for the improper use of disclosure of such information.").
197. Ritter, supra note 193, at 106 ("despite the enactment of GLB, delayed
implementation of its regulations, proposed additional federal legislation, and a
proliferation of state legislation have created great uncertainty for financial institutions in
choosing a path forward.")
198. Id.
199. Id. at 106-7.
200. Id. at 107-4
201. See Hurt, supra note 122.
202. Gallagher, supra note 194.
203. Id.
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Unlike the GLB, HIPAA does preempt state laws unless the state
laws offer more strict privacy protections." Determining which laws
are on point and which offer more security, however, becomes a very
subjective undertaking."5 Medical organizations are left unsure
whether they must comply with state or federal privacy laws.""
Additionally, most state privacy laws try to strike a balance between
the need for information and personal security.07 HIPAA's limited
preemption only leaves the strictest federal and state laws resulting in
an imbalance between privacy and data compilation that overly
restricts information flows.2'
The reason for the uncertainty under both the GLB and HIPAA
can be traced back to the premise underlying both attempts to
quantify privacy. Because privacy is so ill defined, the parties involved
cannot be sure what they must do to comply with the laws. Both laws
endeavor to create a definite minimum level of security without ever
deciding upon the exact contours of privacy in their respective
contexts.
The benefit of an automated transactional system, then, is that it
does not require the government to decide what constitutes private
information. The system will lower transaction costs and bring the
online privacy environment closer to Coase's ideal world. As such,
the negotiations between consumers and electronic businesses will
eventually arrive at an optimal allocation of privacy.' The
government can allow markets to operate unobstructed to determine
the value of privacy for each consumer, rather than force a clunky,
one-size-fits-all definition on all members of the online community.
Additionally, by creating a private cause of action, the
government can ensure ample security for users. After users decide
individually how much restriction they would like to place on the use
of their information, they can feel comfortable that their wishes will
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D. Commodifying Privacy
Many privacy scholars may still object to the automated system,
nevertheless, because privacy is the type of good where consumers do
not know the benefits until they are lost. Professor Anita Allen
argues that the development of markets for privacy has led to an
erosion of privacy-related tastes and expectations.2 0 There has been
evidence in recent decades that people's expectations of privacy are
dwindling.211 Professor Allen attributes this attrition, at least in part,
to the many opportunities to both sell and consume private
information.2 People are able to sell their privacy for money and
celebrity through such venues as television reality shows and
tabloids. 3 Conversely, consumers can buy other people's private
information in newspapers and magazines and through the Internet.214
The wearing down of a taste for privacy can be damaging both
because of the moral implications and the loss of other benefits
privacy provides. 5
If these presumptions are true, then an automated exchange of
information online will speed up the diminution of the taste for
privacy. As people become accustomed to trading away their private
information for data, their expectation for privacy will decrease. The
eventual result will inevitably be a loss of any expectation of privacy
online.
Professor Ian Ayers and Matthew Funk point out, however, that
whether commodification diminishes people's taste to secure their
private information depends on the status quo that the market
replaces. 6 When an item is given extremely high significance,
encouraging commodification could lead to a loss of value. In the
current system, however, marketers are allowed to invade consumers'
privacy at no cost. 217 Marketers do not need consent before they
monitor users' activities online. In fact, users often do not even know
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the observation is taking place.218 The creation of a market would
increase the importance the community places on private
information. The regime would change from one where privacy is
worth nothing to one where people could receive added safety
measures for their data.2 9 Additionally, the level of monitoring will
decrease, as some people who currently receive no protection will
receive some or even complete security.
Creating an automated exchange will also allow users to
experiment with the importance they place on their privacy. A user
could originally set their browser to allow complete disclosure. If this
setting turns out to reveal too much information and the user suffers
undesirable consequences, she could simply adjust the setting to allow
more protection. The automated system will thus give an opportunity
to test Professor Allen's conclusions.
V. Conclusion
This article has developed the concept for a technological
solution to the problem of online privacy. Technology can be used to
encourage an information exchange between users and websites.
Because the technology can serve to reduce transaction costs, the two
parties will come to the optimal allocation of privacy online.
This solution assumes a different perspective on the traditional
debate. While most proposals endeavor to come to a consensus upon
either a common definition or a common value system for privacy, an
automated transaction simply makes optimal use of the online market
the ultimate goal. Because the Internet is efficiency enhancing,
encouraging optimal utilization will help increase the effectiveness for
the overall market. Rather than define privacy, the government
should instead encourage trust, which will result in the maximum
benefits for the economy as a whole. Maybe R2-D2 is not so bad after
all.
218. 1998 FTC REPORT, supra note 4.
219. See Ayres & Funk, supra note 216, at 130-32.
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